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I. INTRODUCTION
With these remarks, the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor
joined a host of other federal' and state3 judges who have begun to
acknowledge the vital role Indian tribal courts play in the delivery
of justice in Indian communities across this country. Indian tribal
courts are institutions charged with the daunting task of providing
forums for both Indians and non-Indians to air increasingly com-
plicated disputes4 that arise in Indian country, oftentimes doing so
2. See Letter from Chief Judge Richard Arnold to Office of Policy Develop-
ment, Department of Justice (July 1, 1997) (on file with author). On June 25,
1997, the Judicial Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit voted unanimously to establish a Committee on Tribal Justice. The Coun-
cil voted this way in response to a report from United States District Court Judge
Lawrence Piersol. Judge Piersol had been unofficially appointed by Chief Judge
Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit to explore the possibility of creating a fed-
eral-tribal judges' forum similar to the Ninth Circuit's Ad Hoc Task Force on
Tribal Courts chaired by Senior Circuit CourtJustice William C. Canby. See id. In
the letter to the Office of Policy Development, Chief Judge Arnold indicated that
the federal judges perceive the establishment of the committee as "an important
step in the improvement of the administration of justice, that we can learn from
the tribal judges and, perhaps, be of some help to them." Id.
3. See id. The Minnesota state and tribal judges have begun the process of
creating a Minnesota State Court/Tribal Court Committee. See Minnesota State
Court/Tribal Court Committee, Minutes from Meeting at Prairie Island Commu-
nity (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The initial meeting of the Committee
was held on July 18, 1997 on the Prairie Island Indian Community and several
joint committees of state and tribal court judges were created including: aJuris-
diction/Education subcommittee; a December Judicial Workshop subcommittee;
a Family and Children's Law Issues committee; aJudicial Exchange Committee; a
Full Faith and Credit and Comity Committee; and a Court Administrators Com-
mittee. See id. It appears from a review of the minutes of that initial meeting that
the turnout among tribal judges and officials was most impressive, strongly sug-
gesting a belief among both tribal and state judges of the importance of their
joint venture. See id.
4. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987). The United
States Supreme Court recognizes, under the "presumptive" jurisdiction rule, that
civil jurisdiction over disputes arising in Indian country, including those involving
non-Indians, presumptively lies in the tribal courts, unless affirmatively limited by
a treaty or federal statute. See id. A related rule is the "tribal court exhaustion"
[Vol. 24
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on a meager judicial budget.5
With this emerging acceptance of Indian tribal courts as play-
ers in preserving and cultivating the judicial landscape, there
comes a concomitant need on the part of tribal, state and federal
courts to convene to examine issues of common concern, both in
order to promote an orderly administration of justice and to ad-
dress the inevitable territorial disputes that arise when three differ-
ent court systems potentially have jurisdiction over claims that arise
in Indian country. Rather than seeking to resolve the "morass of
doctrinal and normative incoherence"6 through judicial decision-
making, the tribal, state, and federal judges who undertake this dia-
logue do so cognizant of the capability of these judicial mecha-
nisms to share and reflect on the tensions that exist between the
three governments. The role these respective judiciaries can play
rule, which requires disputes arising in Indian country to first be litigated in tribal
court before the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. See Bruce H. Lien Co. v.
Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing National Farm-
ers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)). The
"presumptive" jurisdiction rule, combined with the "tribal court exhaustion" rule
has magnified the significance of the tribal court's exercise ofjurisdiction in cases
which formerly would have been brought exclusively in a federal forum. See id. at
856-857; see also United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1996)
(requiring the United States to first exhaust tribal court remedies in a trespass
case); Prescott v. Little Six, Inc. 897 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding
litigant must exhaust a federal claim arising under ERISA first in tribal court).
5. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(h) (1994) (providing procedures that tribes must fol-
low to receive government grants). Most Indian tribal courts in this country are
funded under the tribal priority allocation line item of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs funding pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination Act. See 25 U.S.C. §
450(f) (1994). Because that particular line item of the Bureau Budget is utilized
by tribes to fund a variety of programs, including law enforcement, roads projects,
and housing projects, tribal courts often compete with other essential tribal serv-
ices to receive funding. As Congress itself found in 1993 when it enacted the In-
dian Tribal Justice Act, "tribal justice systems are inadequately funded, and the
lack of adequate funding impairs their operation." Indian Tribal Justice Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-76, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601(8) (1994)).
The Indian Tribal Justice Act was designed to "further the development, opera-
tion, and enhancement of tribal justice systems." See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (1994).
Unfortunately, Congress has chosen not to appropriate any money to implement
the Act and tribal courts are therefore resigned to competing with other essential
tribal programs for limited dollars. See 25 U.S.C. § 3601(8) (1994).
6. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Concilia-
tion In Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1754, 1754 (June 1997)
(characterizing the field of Indian law as incoherent). This article contains a ring-
ing endorsement for the use of negotiation between conflicting sovereigns utiliz-
ing the principles of Indian law conceptualized by the federal courts, rather than
using those principles to stake out positions in a conflagration of litigation. See id.
at 1757.
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in resolving differences is a more optimal use of judicial resources
than the traditional route of decision making, which by its very na-
ture, especially in the area of Indian law, often breeds more confu-
sion and distrust between the competing governmental interests.
A judicial dialogue between the state and tribal courts is also
the natural offspring of recent federal legislative enactments that
require tribal and state courts to accord deference and respect for
each other's judgments in particular cases." Congress appears to
have an increasing predilection for treating tribal courts similarly
to state courts in the promulgation of legislation regarding cross-
border activity.9 Congress finally has become conversant with the
7. See State v. Stone, 557 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that Minnesota's driver's license, seat belt, child restraint and mandatory insur-
ance requirements are not enforceable against Indians in Indian country), affd,
No. C9-96-1291, 1997 WL 761278 (Minn. Dec. 11, 1997). This case provides an
example of the panoply of recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions regarding
the extent to which Public Law 280 vested the state courts of Minnesota with ju-
risdiction over traffic offenses and regulatory offenses that occur in Minnesota's
Indian country. See id.; see also State v.Jackson 570 N.W.2d 503, 503 (Minn. 1997)
(reversing the court of appeals and stating that Minnesota law requiring proof of
insurance is not enforceable in Indian country). But see Bray v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that Minnesota's im-
plied consent law was prohibitory in nature and thus enforceable against an In-
dian in Indian country); Matter of Welfare of B.F.W., 570 N.W.2d 502, 502 (Minn.
1997) (deciding that an offense of a minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage
is a regulatory offense not enforceable against an Indian minor in Indian coun-
try). These cases evidence the confusion that exists regarding the extent to which
states can enforce their laws against Indians on reservations in Public-Law-280 ju-
risdictions and exemplify the need for some tribal-state dialogue on assuring the
safety of reservation highways. See id. Although the state in these cases insists that
it should be able to enforce laws such as driving under the influence and financial
responsibility offenses, the tribes counter by contending that such offenses are
"regulatory" in nature and thus outside the scope of Public Law 280's grant of
state authority. Notwithstanding the conflict, all sides agree that some law en-
forcement agency and judiciary should have the authority to adjudicate such cases
to provide safety for the highways that run through Indian country. See Bray, 555
N.W.2d at 761 (finding Indians are subject to Minnesota implied consent laws).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994) (requiring state and tribal courts to honor
and enforce each other's child support orders); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)
(1994) (requiring states and tribes to honor and enforce domestic violence pro-
tection orders entered by the respective court systems). Additionally, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have proposed an
amendment to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to
include tribal court custody orders as orders to be enforced by state courts and
vice versa. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODYJURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT Acr, § 104
(7 h draft) (March 21, 1997).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (2) (1994) (finding it a crime for a person to cross
a state border, or into or out of Indian country, when an act of domestic violence
is committed with intent). Although this crime is called "interstate domestic vio-
[Vol. 24
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reality that a third sovereign, Indian tribes, exists which exercises
substantial authority in Indian country °. The ultimate success of
such federal enactments will inevitably hinge upon the ability of
state and tribal, as well as tribal and federal courts, to accommo-
date each other's interests."
Similar dynamics engineer the relations between tribal and
federal courts, with the federal judiciary, rather than Congress, be-
ing the primary conductor. The tribal court exhaustion rule, a
"prudential rule,"'2 formulated by the federal courts to facilitate the
development of tribal court jurisprudence while offering the fed-
eraljudiciary the opportunity to examine a dispute through a tribal
lens, has synergized the relationship between federal and tribal
lence" it is apparent that a person does not have to cross a state boundary to
commit the offense. See id. Interestingly, the crime of interstate domestic vio-
lence can occur intrastate even in Public-Law-280 states such as Minnesota, not-
withstanding the fact that Minnesota state courts can nonetheless continue to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over most persons who cross into Indian country, Indian and
non-Indian alike, except on the two reservations where the tribal and federal
courts retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction, Red Lake and Bois Forte. See id.;
Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
This creates a situation on some reservations in Minnesota where a person can
come onto an Indian reservation in Minnesota with the intent to commit domes-
tic violence, do so, and potentially be subject to jurisdiction by tribal, state or fed-
eral authorities, a rare occurrence indeed. See 19 U.S.C. § 226 (1994); Public Law
280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
10. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1997) (holding tribal
courts have jurisdiction over disputes in Indian country).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b) (1994). An example of this is again in the area of
cross-border domestic violence activity. If a tribal court issues a protection order
which is violated off the reservation within the jurisdiction of the state courts, the
state and tribe must have a protocol in place to determine issues, such as where
the violator will be prosecuted and how the violator will be extradited back to ei-
ther the tribal or state jurisdiction, since the statute itself only requires tribes and
states to recognize each other's orders, not how to recognize them. See id.
12. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1411 (1997) (clarifying that
the tribal court exhaustion rule is not an absolute jurisdictional rule, but one
which is the creature of the prudence of the federal courts to defer their valid ju-
risdiction to that of the tribal courts, in order to facilitate the tribal court's devel-
opment for the tribal court to offer guidance on issues of tribal law that the fed-
eral courts may not understand). The court stated in Strate. "we do not extract
from National Farmers anything more than a prudential exhaustion rule, in defer-
ence to the capacity of tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for
accepting (or rejecting) jurisdiction." Id. (quoting National Farmer's Union Ins.
v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S 845, 857 (1985)). The lesson for tribal courts is that the
federal courts gave birth to and can destroy the tribal court exhaustion rule. See
id. at 1409 (holding without express authorization by federal law, tribes have lim-
ited jurisdiction over non-members).
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courts. In many instances, tribal courts are being called upon to
develop the factual record and offer a tribal perspective on a con-
flict that is inevitably destined for federal court review."' Although
this exhaustion rule was originally designed to permit the inchoate
tribal court assessment of the extent of a tribal court's adjudicatory
authority over a non-Indian litigant,14 it has proven to be quite elas-
tic with certain federal courts, 5 and even some state courts, 16 stay-
ing their hands in deference to tribal court jurisdiction in disputes
that do not directly implicate jurisdictional issues. 7
13. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997) (refusing to intervene to stay a $250,000,000.00 tribal
court judgment against Burlington Northern until the railroad exhausted its ap-
pellate remedies, even in the face of substantial due process arguments). The
Burlington Northern case provides an example of how deferential federal courts
have become to tribal court adjudications. See id.
14. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (involving the
extent to which a tribal court can exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian liti-
gant); Nat'l Farmer's Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985) (explaining a tribal court's civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian litigant); see
also Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1416 (1997) (examining the limits
on a tribal courts ability to exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian litigant).
15. Even the United States, almost invariably a participant in federal litiga-
tion only, has been required to litigate its interests in tribal court in certain con-
texts. Several cases have held that the federal government must exhaust its tribal
court remedies when attempting to eject a trespasser from Indian trust land. See
United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
16. See Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379, 384
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Klammer shows that Minnesota's judiciary has given the
tribal court exhaustion rule only a lukewarm acceptance. In Klammer, a panel of
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a suit brought by a patron of a tribally-
owned business against the business involving on-reservation activity should ini-
tially be brought in the tribal court, notwithstanding clear state court jurisdiction
under Public Law 280, because the lawsuit involved an issue of the sovereign im-
munity of the Tribe. See id. Another panel in a similar dispute brought against
the same Tribe's business interests disagreed and held that the state court should
not defer to the tribal court's exercise of inchoate jurisdiction. See Granite Valley
Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Jackpot Junction Bingo & Casino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 138
(Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. April 15, 1997); see also Gavle v. Little Six,
Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Minn. Ct. App 1995), afftd, 555 N.W.2d 284 (Minn.
Oct. 31, 1996) (holding that state courts in Minnesota need not abstain from the
exercise of valid state court jurisdiction over a suit against an enterprise of an In-
dian tribe involving on and off-reservation activity when the enterprise claims
immunity from suit). See infra, Part II.C. for an interplay between the Minnesota
abstention rule and full faith and credit and comity issues.
17. SeeAbdo v. Fort Randall Casino, 957 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D.S.D. 1997).
Abdo involved a suit of an ex-casino manager against a tribal casino, which was in-
dependently cognizable under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and subject to
tribal court exhaustion rule. See id. Abdo also provides an example of the sover-
[Vol. 24
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Expansion of the tribal court exhaustion doctrine demands at-
tention to the nuances of tribal-federal court interaction. This in-
cludes an examination of the degree of consideration, if any, a fed-
eral court should give to tribal court interpretations of tribal law,
federal law, or in some circumstances state law.' The development
of standards through federal judicial decision-making has been in-
consistent to this point.' 9 This inconsistency reveals the necessity
for tribal-federal court dialogue regarding how the tribal court re-
cord will be treated by the federal judiciary, and how the federal
courts can avoid the replication of effort in developing a factual re-
cord in order to dispense justice to litigants in a more expedient
manner.
eign immunity defense, which while only tangentially related to jurisdiction, is in-
creasingly being subjected to the tribal court exhaustion rule. See id. Several fed-
eral courts have invoked the tribal court exhaustion rule to permit tribal courts to
litigate issues surrounding the defense, even when an independent federal statute
seemed to authorize the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over the principal
cause of action without deferring to tribal courts. See id.; see also Davis v. Mille
Lacs Band, No. 5-95-187, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 1996) (staying federal
court action pending exhaustion of tribal court remedies and tribal court deter-
mination of waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in a sexual harassment action).
18. See Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996). The court
in Hicks was confronted with the question of whether tribal courts can exercise
jurisdiction over a cause of action against a state official, a case implicating the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of state officials from suits in foreign courts, and
opted to defer to tribal court jurisdiction. See id. But see Yellowstone County v.
Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a tribal court lacked juris-
diction to enjoin county officials from assessing and collecting an ad valorem tax
on fee land owned by tribal members within reservation boundaries).
19. These inconsistencies are evident in the Eighth Circuit's cases discussing
the appropriate standard of review of tribal court decisions interpreting tribal law.
In Twin City Construction Co. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the entire
court was badly split on the question of whether a tribal court could exercise civil
jurisdiction over a non-Indian litigant in the face of a tribal constitutional provi-
sion that seemed to prohibit the exercise ofjurisdiction. 857 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir.
1988), vacated en banc, 866 F.2d 971 (1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989), va-
cated, 911 F.2d 137, 140 (1990). The en banc court split on the issue, resulting in
the affirmance of a district court order enjoining the tribal court from continuing
to exercise jurisdiction. See Twin City Constr. Co., 866 F.2d at 972. Later, after the
tribe changed its constitution, the court directed the district court to vacate the
injunction against the tribal court. Twin City Constr. Co., 911 F.2d at 140. This
somewhat less than deferential standard should be compared to the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, where a panel of
the court confronted a tribal court exercise of jurisdiction in apparent contradic-
tion to a constitutional provision similar to the one in Twin City Construction re-
stricting tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians. See City of Timber Lake, 10 F.3d
554, 558 (8th Cir. 1993). In City of Timber Lake, the panel ruled that it must defer
to the tribal court interpretation of its own constitution and thus affirmed the ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction. Id. at 559.
7
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Congress has thrown another interesting cog into the tribal-
federal machinery by the enactment of legislation conferring fed-
eral court jurisdiction over disputes that once were within the ex-
clusive province of tribal courts.20 This creates the need to examine
how to avoid the duplication of litigation in federal and tribal court
and whether a mechanism can be created to laterally transfer pro-
ceedings from one jurisdiction to another.
This article attempts to examine some of the issues that con-
front tribal, state, and federaljudges. These judges have begun the
process of engaging fellow judges in a dialogue intended to pro-
mote the objective of delivering justice for all litigants, Indian and
non-Indian alike. One caveat about judicial forums that must be
remembered by all judges who engage in this important work is
that members of the respective judiciaries will not, and should not,
attempt to resolve the substantive issues that oftentimes bedevil the
respective executive and legislative branches of tribal, state and
federal governments. If judges enter into forums with the hope
and expectation of using the forum blueprint to reallocate jurisdic-
tion or resolve long-standing treaty enforcement issues, their hopes
will invariably be dashed. Instead, the agenda must be one that
concedes the existing authority of each governmental entity and
attempts to facilitate the exercise of that authority by the removal
of judicial impediments. Judges who do not have the political
stomach to accept the somewhat muddled landscape Indian law
represents in its present form, and who believe that a competing
jurisdiction should merely come around to his or her perspective,
as an alternative to interpreting cryptic congressional enactments
and court decisions, probably will find tribal-state or tribal-federal
forums unsatisfying and unyielding. Conversely, even those judges
who cannot discern "heads or tails" from baffling Supreme Court
decisions such as Brendale21 and Wold Engineering2 but can identify a
20. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 107 Stat. 1416 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450(f) (1990)) (making tribal employees federal actors
for purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act); FGS Constructors v. Carlow, 64 F.3d
1230, 1230 (8th Cir. 1995) (ruling that project engineer was not Indian contrac-
tor, therefore, the United States was not liable for negligent performance); Le-
soeur v. United States, 21 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that National
Park Service's power to exempt tribe's river tours from regulation was within the
discretionary function exception to sovereign immunity under the FTCA).
21. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands Of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 409 (1989) (holding that the Tribe does not have authority to zone
land owned by non-members within the reservation).
22. See Three Affiliated Tribes Of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
[Vol. 24
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common interest in ensuring access to at least one forum for a liti-
gant involved in a dispute in Indian country, may find the forum
concept a richly rewarding experience.
This article first attempts to catalog the issues that certain state
and tribal forums have identified and concentrated their efforts on
resolving through judicial cooperation. In many ways the issues are
driven by the state of federal law impacting a particular state, nota-
bly Public Law 280, especially with regard to which court exercises
jurisdiction over disputes arising in Indian country in that particu-
lar state: state courts, tribal court, or both under a concurrent ju-
risdiction scheme. 3 Understandably, in a state where state courts
exercise virtually no jurisdiction over Indian country, the tribal and
state courts located there have different issues on which to deliber-
ate than those in a state where the state exercises primary jurisdic-
tion and the tribal courts have narrow authority. There does ap-
pear to be some universal issues, however, that span this Public Law
280 breach.
Next, this article addresses tribal-federal court issues, while
noting the differences in states where the federal courts exercise
very limited jurisdiction over Indian country compared to those in
which the federal courts exercise extensive criminal and civil juris-
diction under various federal statutes.24
Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 888 (1986) (explaining that the state jurisdictional law is in-
consistent with federal law and imposes undue burden on federal and tribal in-
terests).
23. The federal law which has impacted jurisdictions most dramatically in
Indian country is Public Law 280. See Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326
(1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). Public Law 280 vests certain states, including
Minnesota, with mandatory jurisdiction over Indian country in their state, with the
exception of the Red Lake reservation, and permits other states to accept jurisdic-
tion over Indian country. This grant ofjurisdiction has proven confusing because
it does not extend to the state enforcement of regulatory law, but only prohibitory
laws. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207-12
(1987).
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994). One impact of Public Law 280 was to relieve
the federal courts of the primary burden of adjudicating major criminal violations
on Indian reservations and place that obligation on state courts. See id. (granting
consent to any state not having criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian coun-
try); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 380 (1976) (holding federal
courts still have a role to play in criminal prosecution of applicable crimes that
occur in Indian country); United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d 971, 972-73 (8th Cir.
1997) (showing a federal court prosecution of Indians for violating the Airborne
Hunting Act, which is not violative of Public Law 280).
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II. TRIBAL-STATE FORUMS
A. The Forum as An Educational Tool
For non-tribal judges, one exciting prospect about inviting
tribal judges into judicial forums is the opportunity to explore the
native paradigm of justice and possibly borrow from that paradigm
to dispense justice in non-Indian courts. Many state and federal
judges are eager to participate in forums with tribal judges simply
because they know little about tribal justice techniques and are in-
terested in developing relationships with the tribal judges in the
area. The state and federal judges want to glean how tribal judges
go about resolving disputes, possibly with an eye towards synthesiz-
ing those methods with their own.25 A Minnesota example of this
process is the working agreement between the Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe and the Mille Lacs County District Court to deal with cer-
tain non-violent criminal offenders by referring them to a
"Sentencing Circle." This program was started by the Tribe to de-
velop community input into the appropriate sentences for certain
offenders, with an emphasis on the offender making restitution to
the community.26 Developing such contacts, and fusing the native
paradigm of justice with the traditional Anglo law, is especially im-
portant for state judges in those areas where many litigants who
appear before them are native people. Understanding the history
of how those native people resolved conflicts may bring extra
credibility to the state court judge and may, in the long run, make
herjob easier.
However, understanding the historical development of tribal
courts and how they attempt to integrate customary practices and
traditions into their court systems is a difficult proposition. Ex-
plaining how disputes are resolved extra-judicially among any
group of people is a little akin to empirically describing how one
puts his pants on in the morning: it is done subconsciously without
attributing some method or technique to the experience. 2 Yet, the
25. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 1, at 14 (contemplating the possibilities of
state and federal courts modeling their alternative dispute resolution practices on
the Navajo Peacemaker Court system).
26. See Hon. Steven P. Ruble, Development of Sentencing Circles in the Mille
Lacs Ojibwe Community: Ajudicial Perspective, Presentation to the 1996 Annual
Conference ofJudges in Minnesota (on file with author).
27. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Tribal Court describes this
character of Indian law: "Indian law is different. It does not rely on 'paper knowl-
[Vol. 24
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Anglo legal system abhors a system of unwritten law based upon
customary practice and tradition. It is fundamentally based on
the notion that the law is to be published so that the populace is
put on notice both of the substance of the law and the procedures
utilized to reach results.2 9 This may explain the disappointment of
some people who examine a tribal code for the mysteries and in-
genuity of traditional and customary law, only to discover codes
surprisingly similar in many respects to state and federal codes."
This may also explain the reluctance of practitioners to participate
in tribal court litigation because of a perception that the applicable
law is not readily accessible, thus not susceptible to crafting in or-
der to champion a client's claim. It is thus important for those in-
experienced in tribal justice systems to understand the historical
edge', or the theories of academics. If law is norms, values and moral principles, it
can be preserved and communicated in many ways. Indians learn it subcon-
sciously." C. J. Robert Yazzie, Traditional Indian Law, 9 TRIBAL COURT REc. 8, 11
(Spring-Summer 1996).
28. See Christian M. Freitag, Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposition
of Due Process, 72 IND. L.J. 831, 861 (1997) (arguing, "[t]he law of Anglo-American
society is preserved and transmitted in writings, rather than in the oral manner
customary to tribal people"); Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why it
Matters, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1165, 1185 (1997) (stating, "[a] system of law in a
modern Western society would be fundamentally defective without a legislative
body as a basic functional element of the system" and "[s]ome such body must
exist with legitimate power to make general written law ordering human relation
in advance").
29. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that "the void-
for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement"); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1591 (1996)
(holding that "while strict constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defen-
dants are not applicable to civil cases, basic protection against judgments without
notice afforded by due process clause is implicated by civil [statutory and adminis-
trative] penalties").
30. There are tribal codes that attempt to articulate in written form the cul-
tural and normative basis for Indian law. An example is the Mille Lacs Band Stat-
utes, interestingly enough published by West Publishing, which describe the tradi-
tional theory of the Mille Lacs Band:
The theory of law of the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians is based upon a high regard for the concept of sha wa ni ma. It
is one of our ways of life according to custom. The purpose of sha wa ni
ma is to keep the people together as one. This purpose is good for all
people. It serves to balance the forces of life and brings stability to all
the people. To achieve this way of life, the laws of the Band shall be con-
strued to balance the rights of the individual with the need to continue
to co-exist in peace and harmony with one another.
24 MILLE LAcs BAND STAT. ANN. § 2003 (West 1996).
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evolution of tribal justice in order to appreciate their present
status.
B. History of Tribal Courts
1. Blame It on Crow Dog
How then did many tribal courts reach their present station
where the written law they apply is analogous, in many regards to
state and federal laws, yet the judges in those courts are expected
to apply a particular native paradigm of justice sometimes at vari-
ance with those written laws? 3' This incongruity can be blamed on
Crow Dog, a Brule Sioux who killed another Brule, Spotted Tail, in
the early 1880s, on what is now the Rosebud Sioux Indian reserva-
tion in South Dakota. At the time of the killing, the band had no
formalized court system to resolve disputes that were traditionally
resolved by the tiospayes, or extended families, that respected each
side in a conflict.33 Nor were there special territorial courts with
specific jurisdiction to resolve disputes among those Indians who
had been relegated to Indian reservations. The band, invoking
traditional custom and practice, resolved the killing by requiring
Crow Dog to provide certain necessities for Spotted Tail's family, a
type of restitution that restored the loss of Spotted Tail .
Into this fray stepped the Dakota territorial government who
prosecuted Crow Dog for murder in a territorial court and con-
31. Balancing this need to appease the non-Indian world by providing justice
in a manner that comfortably fits into Anglo notions of due process, while simul-
taneously adjudicating in a manner that is loyal to the practices and customs of a
tribe, is one of the prevailing dynamics of tribal court jurisprudence today and has
been the subject of numerous commentaries. See generally Robert Laurence,
Dominant-Society Law and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(arguing that although the notion of tribal sovereignty has been gready reduced
by the United States Supreme Court over the years, the Navajo Nation continues
to be a sovereign nation); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams and Hard Work:
An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wisc. L. REV. 411 (1992) (analyzing the
difficulties in reconciling the dominant Anglo-American and Native American Ju-
risprudential viewpoints); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innova-
tive Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994) (commenting on the Anglo-American legal
training on tribal cases and the sovereignty of tribal courts).
32. See SYDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 100-01 (1994).
33. See id. at 104-05.
34. See id. at 105.
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victed and sentenced him to death 5 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and held that the territorial courts of
the United States had not been vested with the jurisdiction over
criminal offenses committed by one Indian against another within
an Indian reservation. 6 The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 also did
not give the federal government such authority.37 The result of this
decision was that the Brule band of the Dakota were left to their
own principles of justice when determining punishments for those
band members who committed crimes against other Indians. 8
The federal government enacted the Major Crimes Act 9 to fill
what was perceived as a void in the enforcement of law created by
the Crow Dog decision. The Major Crimes Act specifies certain
felonies committed by one Indian against another in Indian coun-
try, and vests the federal and territorial courts with jurisdiction over
such offenses.4 0 This Act did not, however, fulfill the need for a
reservation-based dispute resolution method, both for reservation
Indians and for those non-Indians increasingly encroaching upon
Indian land.' Into this breach stepped the Bureau of Indian Af
fairs (BIA), who began to establish "Courts of Indian Offenses" in
1883. These courts, hoped federal officials, would lead to the ac-
culturation and assimilation of Indian people into the non-Indian
world. 3
35. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
36. See id. at 571-72.
37. See id. at 572.
38. See id.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). Congress obviously felt that the type of re-
storative justice meted out by the Brule to Crow Dog was not punitive enough and
felt that more severe measures were needed. This is not surprising because
throughout the history of the immigration of Europeans into the North American
continent there have been various references to the people occupying the Ameri-
cas as "lawless." See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 106 (1884).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The constitutionality of Congress' exercise of
authority to enact the Major Crimes Act was upheld in United States v. Kagama, a
particularly odious decision to Indian tribes because the court concocted the
"plenary authority" doctrine. 118 U.S. 375, 377 (1886). The court held that Con-
gress can legislate with regard to Indian tribes with relative impunity. See id. at
378.
41. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 62 (1995) (citing WILLIAM
HAGEN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 145 (1966)). These courts were not models of
justice, as the only requirement to be a jurist was that a person not be a polyga-
mist. See id.
42. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ETAL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 207 (3d ed. 1991).
43. See id. at 151. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) began setting up
Courts of Indian Offenses on many reservations without the express authorization
of Congress, which inevitably led to challenges in their authority. None of these
13
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The Courts of Indian Offenses, also known as Code of Federal
Regulation Courts (C.F.R. Courts), were not "tribal" courts in the
sense that the values and mores reflected in the laws promulgated
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs were "tribal" values. Instead, these
courts were the agents of assimilation, and followed laws and regu-
lations designed to assimilate the Indian people into both the relig-
ious and jurisprudential mainstream of American society." Non-
Indians, however, could not be compelled to appear in such courts
unless they expressly stipulated to civil jurisdiction. This restriction
still exists in the present Code of Indian Offenses,4 despite clear
United States Supreme Court pronouncements recognizing the
inherent authority of tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-
Indians." The restriction also made its way into several tribal con-
stitutions and codes after tribes adopted their own tribal codes.47
2. Precursors to Modern Tribal Courts
Only with the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934," and the subsequent promulgation of a revised Code of In-
dian Offenses for Indian tribes, which expressly recognized for the
challenges were successful and the BIA reigned as the ultimate arbiter of what
laws and polices would be enforced through the CFR courts. See id. at 205-06; see
also Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 95 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding In-
dian tribal courts have authority under 18 U.S.C § 1152); United States v. Clapox,
35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (holding the United States is the ultimate guardian
of Indian tribes).
44. For example, one of the early CFR ordinances, violation of which could
subject an Indian to incarceration provided that "if an Indian refuses or neglects
to adopt habits of industry, or to engage in civilized pursuits or employment, but
habitually spends his time in idleness and loafing, he shall be deemed a vagrant."
HAGEN, supra note 41, at 120. In the first challenge to the authority of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to create and maintain court systems for Indians, the federal dis-
trict court in upholding that authority clearly intimated the function of these
courts as "mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the gov-
ernment of the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition
of these dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian." Clapox,
35 F. at 577. The same court described an Indian reservation as an institution "in
the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of
an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which dis-
tinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man." Id.
45. See25 C.F.R. § 11.103 (1997).
46. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,15 (1986).
47. See Twin City Constr. Co. v. Turtle Mountains Band of Chippewa Indians,
911 F.2d 137, 138 (8th Cir. 1986). (holding the tribal court had proper jurisdic-
tion of all issues for construction company case).
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first time the right of Indian tribes to supplant the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) by the adoption of their own code of laws, 9
did Indian tribes receive the federal government's imprimatur to
create and operate their own court systems. Not surprisingly, be-
cause of the need of Indian tribes to receive permission from the
Department of Interior to supplant the C.F.R with their own code,
many tribes parroted many of the provisions of law contained in
the C.F.R. courts to appease the Department of Interior.' ° As a re-
sult, many of the laws contained in the old C.F.R. resemble many of
the constitutional and statutory provisions contained in modem-
day tribal codes.5'
Two additional federal statutory provisions need to be exam-
ined to fully appreciate the evolutionary process of Indian tribal
courts. In 1953, Congress, concerned about the apparent void in
criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction on some Indian reservations,
enacted Public Law 83-28051 conferring jurisdiction over most
criminal and civil actions arising in Indian country to the courts in
five particular states. These states included California, Minnesota
(with the exception of the Red Lake Indian reservation), Nebraska,
Oregon (with the exception of the Warm Springs reservation) and
53
Wisconsin (with the exception of the Menominee reservation).
Those states not vested with jurisdiction were given the option of
accepting jurisdiction by amending any constitutional limitations
on jurisdiction and by affirmatively accepting jurisdiction through
legislative enactment.
54
49. See 3 FED. REG. 952-59 (1938) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1997) (giving
both substantive and procedural Indian law).
50. See25 C.F.R. § 11.103 (1997).
51. See id. An example of this is tribal constitutional and statutory restrictions
on tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Many tribal codes until recently
required a stipulation from a non-Indian before civil tribal court jurisdiction
could be exercised over him. See id; see also City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling that an Indian tribe
could impose liquor control and business license ordinances on non-Indian op-
erators of liquor establishments on fee-patented lands in cities within the reserva-
tions).
52. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
53. See id.
54. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1994). This section of Public Law 280 was
amended by passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which now requires an af-
firmative vote by the tribal electorate before states can assume any further juris-
diction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994). Before that amendment, however, ten states
accepted some form of jurisdiction over Indian country. See FELIX COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 28 (1982).
15
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Public Law 280 has proved to be an impediment to tribal court
development both in those mandatory states and in optional states
where some form of state court jurisdiction was adopted. It has
also heightened the level of jurisdictional ambiguity that exists in
Indian country. Because many tribes and the Department of Inte-
rior perceived that Public Law 280 stripped tribal court systems of
jurisdiction, efforts among those tribes to adopt tribal codes and
inject money into tribal justice systems were all but stymied.55 In
addition, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, up to that point the princi-
pal funders of tribal justice systems, also believed that it no longer
needed to fund tribal court systems and C.F.R. courts on Public-
Law-280 reservations because one of the objectives of Public Law
280 was to defray federal costs for tribal law enforcement by turn-
ing those functions over to state and county governments.
56
It has been demonstrated in Minnesota recently, 7 however,
that tribal court development remained integral even among those
Public-Law-280 tribes, both because of the jurisdictional limitations
expressed in Public Law 280,58 and because Public Law 280 did not
confer jurisdiction over "regulatory" as opposed to prohibitory
criminal matters.!5 Additionally, laws passed subsequent to Public
Law 280, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act,60 permitted all In-
dian tribal courts, including those in Public-Law-280 states, to exer-
cise substantial jurisdiction both inside and outside Indian country,
but the exercise of jurisdiction was contingent upon the existence
of tribal dispute resolution forums.
55. See id.
56. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976) (discussing the con-
cern for lawlessness on Indian reservations as the reason for enacting Public Law
280).
57. See State v. Stone, No. C9-96-1291, 1997 WL 761278, at *2 (Minn. Dec. 11,
1997), affg, 557 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
58. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1994). Public Law 280 did not vest state courts
with authority over trust and restricted Indian property. See id. (precluding a state
court from exercising jurisdiction over an eviction action from Indian trust land);
see also All Mission Indian Hous. Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330, 331 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (exercising common law jurisdiction because state court lacked jurisdiction
over eviction action from Indian trust land federal court). But see Round Valley
Indian Housing Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F. Supp. 1343, 1346-47 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding there was no common law federal court jurisdiction over eviction action
from Indian allotted land).
59. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208
(1987).
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(A) (1994) (stating an Indian tribe has jurisdiction
over any child who resides on a reservation).
61. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562
[Vol. 24
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The impact of Public Law 280 explains why many tribal courts,
including those in Minnesota, are of very recent vintage. Igno-
rance over the fallout from Public Law 280 may also explain the
misperception many courts have over the recent development of
tribal courts among the Sioux tribes and bands of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe in Minnesota.62 There has been some insinuation
that tribal court development, in some states where tribes have
been successful in gaming ventures, is the product of the desire to
shield the tribe from suits in state and federal courts concerning its
63gaming operations. Theoretically, the creation of tribal courts
would resolve such disputes in favor of the tribes. 4 Although this
influx of commercial contacts may explain in part the increasing
interest among Minnesota tribes in the development ofjudicial sys-
tems, it is just as likely that many of these tribes, mired in poverty
before gaming, are only now reaping the economic gains necessary
to support judicial systems not supported by the Department of In-
terior because of Public Law 280.65 Other tribes are attempting to
create and maintain court systems in order to regain the sovereign
66authority stripped from them by the passage of Public law 280, or
to exercise the jurisdiction over their children recognized by the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978.67
(9th Cir. 1991). In Native Village of Venetie IRA Council the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Indian tribal courts in Alaska retained the
concurrent jurisdiction to render adoption decrees which had to be recognized
by the state under the Indian Child Welfare Act.
62. See Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Community, 125 F.3d 621, 622-23
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that exhaustion by the Prairie Island Indian Community
Tribal Court was not necessary for litigant because the Tribe did not have an op-
erational court system).
63. See Pat Doyle, Judge Challenges Tribal Sovereignty, STAR TRJB. (Minneapolis),
Feb 19, 1996, at IA.
64. See id.
65. In addition, the Department of Interior inhibited the development of
tribal courts among the constituent bands of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe by
previously declaring that the Minnesota Chippewa tribal constitution prevented
the constituent bands from creating their own court systems. This opinion was
nullified on August 16, 1994 when the Department took the position that the con-
stituent bands could create their own court systems. See Memorandum from Mi-
chael Anderson to Ada Deer (Aug. 16, 1994) (on file with author).
66. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
For example, the Bois Forte Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe obtained a
retrocession of its criminal jurisdiction over Indians who commit criminal offenses
in Indian country under the retrocession provisions of Public Law 280. See 25
U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).
67. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1994). There are some indications that the recent
17
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One last federal statutory enactment which plays a major role
in the molding of modern-day tribal courts is the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968. 8 The ICRA is the basis for the inherent
ambiguities that exist in modem tribal justice systems. It forces In-
dian tribes to base their judicial systems upon Anglo-American no-
tions of due process by superimposing many of the fundamental
rights of the United States Constitution upon tribal justice systems,
even if the values expressed in the Bill of Rights are foreign to na-
tive people. 69 The ICRA, by 1) compelling Indian tribes to give jury
trials to any person charged with a criminal offense containing a
possible penalty of incarceration; 2) conferring upon the accused
the right to remain silent; and 3) debasing the resolution of dis-
putes by consensus rather than by confrontation, forces Indian
tribes to mimic their judicial systems upon state and federal courts
or face coercion by the federal government.
70
This history of externally imposed justice is not an auspicious
71foundation for the development of indigenous justice systems,
and may explain why the uninitiated may find tribal justice systems
push of the individual bands of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe to develop their
own tribal justice systems was the result of an increased interest in exercising ju-
risdiction over off-reservation Indian children who were the subject of child cus-
tody proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act. See Letter from Thomas C.
Jacobs, Office of the Solicitor for the United States Department of Interior, to
Anne McKieg, Assistant Hennepin County (Minnesota) Attorney (July 18, 1995)
(on file with author) (regarding right of individual Bands of the Minnesota Chip-
pewa Tribe to exercise jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings and to
accept transfers ofjurisdiction).
68. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 301-1341 (1994)). Before the enactment of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, it was generally recognized that the United States Constitution
did not regulate an Indian tribe's treatment of its members or non-members. See
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
69. See Kirke Kickingbird, "In Our Image..., After Our Likeness:" The Drive for
the Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 675, 694-95 (1976).
70. See Granite Valley Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Jackpot Junction Bingo & Ca-
sino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). A contemporary example of
this tension arose on the Red Lake Indian reservation where the Tribal Council,
in the face of continuing jury nullification in drug cases, enacted an ordinance
permitting a tribal judge to overturn both ajury conviction and acquittal and im-
pose the opposite verdict should she believe that the jury verdict was the result of
passion or prejudice. See id. at 145 (Randall, J. concurring). In the face of a fed-
eral action seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the tribal court backed down and al-
lowed the defendant to plead to a lesser offense. See id.
71. See generally Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Peace-
making: How The Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235 (1997) (analyzing how the imposition of the Anglo-
American Justice System upon the Seneca Indians of New York led to unprece-
dented violence among a peaceful people).
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especially confounding. Escaping the chains of historical suppres-
sion, however, many Indian tribes have returned to their indige-
nous roots and regained a sense of tradition in the dispute resolu-
tion practices they currently utilize.
3. Modern Tribal Courts: Reconciling the Old and the New
Modern tribal courts73 are faced with the difficult proposition
of resolving increasingly complex disputes in a manner that is both
loyal to tradition, and responsive to Anglo notions of due process.
Tribal courts, perhaps more than any tribal institution other than
educational programs, are in a unique position to rediscover tribal
customs and traditions as a manner of resolving disputes and rein-
tegrating those values into modem Indian life. The resolution of a
dispute in tribal court, however, must always be administered with a
dose of Anglo due process because of the need to have tribal
judgments respected and enforced by outside court systems. A
typical dispute in tribal court today could involve a question involv-
ing the misuse of a revered native spiritual leader's name to market
a malt liquor;74 the right of an heir of a treaty signer to sell an
original replica of the treaty;75 a multi-million dollar personal injury
72. See generally Frederic Brandfon, Tradition And Judicial Review In The Ameri-
can Indian Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991 (1991) (analyzing both tradi-
tional dispute resolution techniques and modern tribal court systems); Gloria Va-
lencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom And Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225
(1994) (reviewing those tribal courts which have attempted to implement tradi-
tional dispute resolution techniques).
73. Approximately 150 tribal courts and 20 Courts of Indian Offenses cur-
rently exist in the United States. See The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Juris-
diction in Indian Country: Hearing on HR 972 Before the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991).
74. See Estate of Tasunke Witko (Crazy Horse) v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
23 Indian L. Rep. 6104, 6113 (Rosebud Sioux Sup. Ct. 1996) (reversing trial
court's dismissal of cultural and legal claims brought by estate against New Jersey
brewery for lack of personal jurisdiction). It should be noted that this case went
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit after a federal
district court in South Dakota enjoined the Tribe from continuing to exercise ju-
risdiction over the non-Indian brewery. See Hornell Brewing v. Whiting, No. 96-
3038, slip op. at 10 (D.S.D. Dec. 3, 1996). The appeals court recently ruled the
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court lacked adjudicatory authority over the dispute arising
from the Breweries' use of the Crazy Horse name in the manufacturing, sale, and
distribution of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor outside the Rosebud Sioux Reservation.
See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, No. 97-1242, 1998 WL
9176, at *6 (8th Cir. Jan. 14, 1998).
75. See In re Guardianship of William Bell, No. -, slip op. at 2 (Fort Ber-
thold Tribal Ct., March 24, 1997) (enjoining the conservator of the estate of an
incapacitated tribal member from selling the original replica of an 1851 treaty on
19
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76dispute; or the authority of a Tribe to operate a nationwide lottery
system." Resolving such disputes traditionally with a touch of judi-
cial pragmatism is the challenge facing modem tribal courts.
4. State and Federal Courts as Models for Tribal Courts
Cultural and legal education in the judicial forum is by no
means a one-way street. Tribal judges have much to learn from
state and federal judges who participate in judicial forums. Al-
though tribal courts may be just as talented in rendering cogent
and just decisions, state and federal justice systems are far more ad-
vanced in the accouterments of justice. Tribal courts are fre-
quently hindered by the lack of a thorough compilation of tribal
court decisions from other jurisdictions,7 s a lack of electronic re-
sources to manage and retrieve court information, and a lack of
ability to access funding for things such as foster care placements,
juvenile diversion programs and probation services. The Anglo
justice system has developed a much more interdisciplinary ap-
proach to dispute resolution than tribal justice systems where the
judge often must render a decision and then personally go out and
solicit the necessary services to implement his ruling.79 Because of
these structural weaknesses in tribal court systems, state and federal
judges are in an ideal position to educate tribal judges about ac-
cessing and utilizing resources, including training resources. 8° Ex-
the ground that it is cultural patrimony and that the incapacitated person was
only the holder, not owner of treaty).
76. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 868 (9th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
77. See Cour d'Alene Tribe v. AT&T Corp., 23 Indian L. Rep. 6060, 6061
(Cour d'Alene Tribal Court 1996) (involving a suit brought by the Tribe to com-
pel AT&T to provide it with the necessary phone service to operate a nationwide
phone lottery.)
78. Although there is an Indian Law Reporter which compiles tribal court
decisions, as well as federal and state law decisions involving Indian law issues, the
decisions contained therein are voluntarily submitted by tribal courts and there is
no regulated method of gathering tribal court decisions.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1994). For example, children placed by state courts
in foster care are eligible for foster care services under Title IV-E of the Social Se-
curity Act if the court order has the necessary language in compliance with fed-
eral law. Children placed by tribal courts are not eligible for foster care services,
unless they access them through a cooperative agreement with a state govern-
ment. See Native Village of Stevens v. Smith, 770 F.2d 1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. Unlike the federal courts, which have the Federal Judicial Center and the
state courts, which may utilize the National Center for State Courts, there is no
one entity that is specifically designated to provide assistance, including technical
assistance and training, to tribal court judges. There are regional organizations,
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amples of such cooperative ventures may include: 1) inviting tribal
judges to the annualJudicial Institutes sponsored in most states; 2)
state administrative officials assisting tribal courts in designing and
maintaining court files and information electronically and allowing
tribal police and others in need to access such files electronically;
3) facilitating cooperative agreements to allow tribal courts to ac-
cess Title IV-E and medical assistance benefits for Indian children
placed by tribal courts; and 4) assisting tribal courts in utilizing
child support enforcement services available to state courts under
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.
C. Full Faith and Credit or Comity between Tribal and State Courts
After tribal and state courts have learned a little about how
each operates, a cornerstone issue that must be addressed and re-
solved is how each court will treat the judgments and orders of the
other. In many ways, this issue is just as important as questions of
jurisdiction. This is especially true in a state where state and tribal
concurrent jurisdiction may be the norm, because deferring to an-
other court's exercise ofjurisdiction may be specious if not accom-
panied by the granting of a degree of deference to that court's ad-
judication. Minnesota, where the state courts have adopted
somewhat of an abstention rule when determining the appropriate
scope of state court jurisdiction for disputes involving tribes or
their members arising in Indian country, provides an example.81 In
states applying a form of abstention with respect to tribal court ju-
risdiction, merely deferring to the tribal prerogative to exercise ini-
tial jurisdiction is vacuous if not accompanied by a certain level of
including the author's organization, and the National Indian Justice Center, but
the funding for these programs is far short of what is needed for a nationwide or-
ganization that serves the some 170 tribal courts now in existence.
81. See Matsch v. Prairie Island Indian Community, 567 N.W.2d 276, 278
(Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. Sept. 18, 1997). "Where two actions be-
tween the same parties, on the same subject, and to test the same rights, are
brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first
acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the administration of complete
justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no
court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its action. State ex rel Min-
nesota Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 173, 262 N.W. 155, 157 (1935).
"This rule rests upon comity and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the execu-
tion of judgments by independent courts, and is a necessary one because any
other rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual collision and be productive of the
most calamitous results." Id.
21
Jones: Welcoming ribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Is
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
deference owed to the ultimate decision of the tribal court.82 Simi-
larly, if a state court has valid jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, yet its
resolution will be ignored by a tribal court whose jurisdiction may
be necessary to enforce the state court resolution, resolving the ju-
risdictional conflict only leads to more conflicts regarding en-
forcement."5
In some instances, the United States has directed the state and
tribal courts to honor each other's orders. Examples include laws
requiring states and Tribes to honor each other's child support or-
ders,8 4 domestic violence protection orders,"5 and child custody or-
ders. 6 A federal circuit court,87 as well as at least one tribal court,88
have concluded that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
82. The type of abstention exercised by federal courts vis-a-vis state adjudica-
tions is very deferential because federal courts must grant the same preclusive ef-
fect to a state court judgment as the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
Therefore, when a federal court abstains in favor of state court adjudication,
rather than deferring its jurisdiction, it is forever precluding federal court review
of the state court decision, with the limited exception of United States Supreme
Court discretionary review, if a federal question is involved, or perhaps habeas
corpus jurisdiction in limited cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). However, many
state courts, including Minnesota, do not have a controlling standard of review for
tribal court decisions. Thus, it is possible that a state court could abstain from ex-
ercising jurisdiction over a case arising in Indian country, but then refuse to ei-
ther enforce or honor the tribal courtjudgment because of the lack of a federal
or state law requirement to do so.
83. Examples of this may include the enforcement of valid child support or-
ders entered by state courts against reservation-domiciled Indians who work for
tribal entities through wage withholdings.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994). See also In re Day v. State 900 P.2d 296, 300
(Mont. 1995) (noting that the Child Support Act includes "Indian Country" in the
definition of "states").
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994). A child custody order under the Indian
Child Welfare Act is an order of foster care placement, termination of parental
rights, pre-adoptive placement or adoptive placement. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)
(1994). Interestingly, the Indian Child Welfare Act does not mandate that a tribal
court grant full faith and credit to a state court order creating the somewhat
anomalous situation where a tribal court could gain a transfer ofjurisdiction over
a child custody proceeding and ignore the state court rulings up to that point of
transfer. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911 (1994) (providing rules for Indian tribe
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings).
87. See In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Dement v. Oglala
Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 514 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to determine
whether the term "territories" in the federal Parental Kidnapping Precaution Act
applies to Indian tribes because the plaintiff had not yet raised the issue in the
tribal court).
88. See Eberhard v. Eberhard, No. 96-005-A, slip op. at 6 (Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribal Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1997).
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Act!9 requires states and tribes to honor each other's custody or-
ders.90 There are also obscure provisions of federal law that seem
to mandate some state court allegiance to tribal law, although their
exact import is not clear.9
Even with regard to those subject matters clearly covered by
federal law, however, merely imposing by federal legislative fiat the
requirement of full faith and credit does not make the practice re-
ality. State and tribal courts cannot recognize each other's judg-
ments if there is no system developed to share information regard-
ing the existence of such orders. This may be particularly
important in an area such as domestic violence where the cogni-
zance of the existence, vel non, of a valid order of protection is
critical to law enforcement officers who need to make split-second
decisions regarding protecting a victim. In those cases state and
tribal courts need to cooperate on the development and mainte-
nance of central registries of orders accessible by both court sys-
tems and law enforcement officers on and off-reservations. Addi-
tionally, there must be protocols developed for the registration of
state and tribal court orders entitled to federal full faith and credit
in each court system to assure effective enforcement.
92 93Some state courts, as well as early federal courts, have con-
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
90. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
proposed an amendment to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and En-
forcement Act to include tribal court custody orders as orders to be enforced by
state courts and vice versa. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICrION AND EN-
FORCEMENTACT, § 104 (7"' draft) (Mar. 21, 1997).
91. Examples include Public Law 280 itself, which mandates that state courts
apply the laws of a tribe, including customary laws, as long as they do not conflict
with state law, in resolving a private dispute. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1994)
(requiring states to give full force and effect to any tribal ordinance or custom,
exercised in the tribal authority, in determination of constitutional civil causes of
action, so long as it is not inconsistent with applicable civil law of the state); 25
U.S.C. § 483(a) (1994) (requiring a state court to defer to tribal court jurisdiction
in a foreclosure of a mortgage on trust land).
92. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (holding that
a tribal decree of adoption is entitled to full faith and credit as a decree of a terri-
tory under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)); Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 533 P.2d 751,
752 (N.M. 1975) (holding that the laws of the Navajo Nation are entitled to full
faith and credit); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, 946 P.2d 1088, 1090 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 944 P.2d 274 (N.M. September 24, 1997) (holding that New
Mexico trial court must honor a tribal court's award of punitive damages against a
non-Indian for wrongful repossession); Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 629 P.2d 340, 344 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d
1334, 1342 (Wash. 1976); see also Walksalong v. Mackey, 549 N.W.2d 384, 387
(Neb. 1996) (indicating that a tribal court order is entitled to full faith and credit
23
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cluded that the federal full faith and credit statute94 applies to tribal
court judgments as judgments of "territorial courts," and thus they
are as entitled to full faith and credit as state and federal court
judgments. 95 Other courts, however, including the Minnesota
Court of Appeals in Desjairlait v. Desjairlait,96 rejected this notion
and concluded that Indian tribes were not even contemplated in
the grand federalist design that underlies principles of full faith
and credit and comity. As one commentator on the question of
full faith and credit between state and tribal courts has proclaimed:
"Indian tribes never entered into or consented to any constitu-
tional social contract by which they agreed to be governed by fed-
eral or state authority, rather than by tribal sovereignty."97 This
under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, although the court
concluded that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction); Jackson County ex rel. Smoker
v. Smoker, 445 S.E.2d 408, 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the concurrent
jurisdiction of a tribal court to establish child support obligation of reservation-
domiciled Indian obligor); Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Okla. 1994)
(holding that state courts must honor tribal court judgments but that the trial
court erred in not allowing a party to attack a tribal court order based upon
fraud); City of Yakima v. Aubrey, 931 P.2d 927, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that a tribal court order was not entitled to full faith and credit due to
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d
689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that Arizona state courts were not re-
quired to give full faith and credit to enactments of a Navajo tribal council); Loh-
nes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977) (holding that the full faith and
credit clause only applies between states and not Indian tribes).
93. See United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103 (1856)
(implying that an Indian tribe is a domestic territory whose "laws and proceedings
of the Cherokee territory, so far as relates to rights claimed under them, should
not be placed upon the same footing as other territories in the Union."); see also
Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1894).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
95. See, e.g., Tracy v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa County, 810 P.2d 1030, 1051
(Ariz. 1991) (finding that a subpoena to appear in a Navajo Court should be en-
forced under the Uniform Attendance of Witnesses Act). See generally Daina B.
Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts From a Federal Court Perspective: A Proposed
Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723, 768-69 (1996)
(arguing that that tribal courts should be treated essentially as federal courts, and
in return give up some of their inherent sovereignty).
96. 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that full faith and
credit was intended between the states, not between tribal courts and states).
97. Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts And The Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 841, 847 (1990). It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding the lack
of tribal consent to join the federalist scheme, of which full faith and credit is an
integral part, Professor Justice Clinton is an advocate of including tribal courts
into the full faith and credit requirements as evidenced by his decision as a Chey-
enne River Supreme CourtJudge. See Eberhard v. Eberhard, No. 96-005-A, passim
(Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct App. Feb. 18, 1997).
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lack of consent renders suspect any notion that Indian tribal gov-
ernments were the intended beneficiaries of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.98
Not only have many state courts rejected the notion that sec-
tion 1738" was intended to apply to tribal court orders,00 but tribal
courts also have hesitated to accord state court orders full faith and
credit under that federal statute.'0 ' This is not because of a distrust
of state courts, but because of the perception that construing gen-
eral federal laws as abrogating tribal sovereign perogatives would
often result in a diminution of tribal sovereignty. 102 There is a
commingling of obligations and duties inherent in section 1738,103
and tribes may feel that they should have a voice in deciding when
their courts have a federal obligation to honor state court judg-
ments, even though they welcome the prospect of having their
court orders enforced by state courts.
0 4
Absent some express federal congressional directive to both
tribes and states to honor each other's judgments, the issue of the
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (using terms such as "State, Territory, or Posses-
sion of the United States").
99. See id.
100. See Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Mont. 1982)
(holding that a tribal court judgment was not a territorial judgment under the
federal statute); Desjairlait v. Desjairlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
102. There is currently a split in the federal circuits on the question of
whether a federal statute of general applicability, that omits any reference to In-
dian tribes, applies to Indian tribes and their entities. See Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Indian Tribal Farm 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
OSHA applied to tribal farm); Smart v. State Farm Ins., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th
Cir. 1989) (applying ERISA to tribal pension plan); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand &
Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting the "Tuscarora approach",
named for dicta utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Power
Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 118 (1960), in which the Court
applied a presumption that a law of general applicability does apply to Indian
tribes). The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, conversely, have applied a standard treaty
abrogation analysis to find that such laws do not apply to Indian tribes unless they
are specifically referenced. See EEOC v. Fond Du Lac Heavy Equip., 986 F.2d 246,
249 (8th Cir. 1993); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir.
1982). The Eighth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Stone, where the Court held
that the Airborne Hunting Act, a federal law of general applicability not referenc-
ing Indians or their treaty rights, applied to tribal members hunting on the White
Earth Indian reservation, may portend a shift of that position towards the Tus-
carora approach. 112 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1997).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
104. See generally BJ. Jones, Tribal Considerations In Comity and Full Faith and
Credit, 68 N.D. L. REv. 689 (1992) (discussing the application of full faith and
credit to tribal court decisions from the perspective of tribal courts).
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degree of deference a state or tribal court owes to another court
system welcomes either a legislative or judicial response. As several
state courts have noted, it is within the inherent powers of a court
to honor foreign court judgments under the doctrine of comity,
notwithstanding the lack of statutory guidance on the issue.05 In a
few states" 6 and several tribes,107 the legislatures have taken the ini-
tiative, often in response to judicial opinions discussing comity and
full faith and credit vis-a-vis foreign courts, to define the parame-
ters for state and tribal recognition ofjudgments. At least one state
legislature has actually circumscribed the granting of comity to
tribal court judgments by state courts, in apparent reaction to a
state supreme court decision.0 8
More commonly, however, in the state domain the issue has
been broached through the process of court rule promulgation,
which in certain states was the product of state-tribal court coop-
eration.'0 9 These court rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
with some states restricting recognition to those tribal courts within
state boundaries,"0 while others tend to recognize any court order
105. See Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 740 (S.D. 1985); Fredericks
v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 167 (N.D. 1990); Eberhard v. Eber-
hard, No. 96-005-A, slip op. at 8-19 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Ap-
peals Feb. 18, 1997).
106. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-302 (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing full faith
and credit for tribal court protection orders); H.P. 926, 118"' Leg., 1" Reg. Sess.
(ME 1997) (requiring full faith and credit for decisions of the Tribal Courts). S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-16-80 (Law Co-op Supp. 1996) (stating that full faith and credit
must be afforded to tribal court tort judgments); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West
1994 and Supp. 1997) (according tribal courtjudgments, orders, and records full
faith and credit in state courts); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 1997)
(providing full faith and credit for tribal courtjudgments when several conditions
are met).
107. See, e.g., 24 MILLE LAcs BAND STAT. ANN. § 3001 (West 1996).
108. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 728 (West 1997). The act permits state
court to recognize tribal court orders and decisions only where the tribal court
reciprocates by recognizing state court orders and decisions. See id.
109. See N.D. ADMIN. R. 37 (West 1997) (referencing the final report of the
North Dakota Tribal/State Court Forum and the March 25 meeting minutes of
the Court Services Administration Committee). The North Dakota Supreme
Court rule, requiring state courts to honor North Dakota tribal court judgments,
was drafted and proposed to the North Dakota Supreme Court by its committee
on tribal and state court affairs, consisting of state and tribal judges in North Da-
kota. See id.
110. See N.D. CT. R. 7.2.; S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-1-25 (Michie 1992); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West 1994 and Supp. 1997) (permitting the recognition of
tribal court orders from the respective states).
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of a federally-recognized tribe."' Some rules restrict recognition to
a certain class of cases,"' while others are far-reaching and would
apparently apply to any tribal court order provided certain requi-
sites are met.113 Some rules specifically authorize the state courts to
honor tribal court orders only upon a showing that the tribal court
recognizes state court orders,"4 while others require recognition
without determining if reciprocity exists."'
Obviously, among those states and tribes which have yet to re-
solve the issues surrounding recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments in tribal and state courts, there is a great deal of flexibil-
ity afforded the judiciary itself to come up with a solution."6  A
tribal-state forum may be the ideal setting for the resolution of the
111. See MICH. CT. R. 2.615; OKLA. ST. DIST. CT. R. 30; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R.
82.5.
112. Arizona, for example, has a court rule dealing with the recognition of
tribal involuntary commitment orders, while several states have enacted court
rules or statutes pertaining to tribal court orders which must be honored under
the newly enacted provisions of the Violence Against Women Act. See 18 U.S.C. §
2265 (1994); ARIz. TRIBAL CT. COMMIT. ORDERS R. 2; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
302 (Michie Supp. 1995) (granting protection orders); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
209A, § 1 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing protection orders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-
5.1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (providing for protection orders in voter registration);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Michie 1997) (affording protection orders). At least
one state governor vetoed legislation requiring the state courts of that state to
honor tribal court protection orders. See S. 93, 72nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 1997).
113. See supra note 110.
114. See MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (B) (1); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, ch. 2, App. Rule
30 (West Supp. 1998); WASH SUPER CT. CIv. R. 82.5 (requiring a state court to
honor a tribal court order unless the tribal court does not reciprocally provide for
the recognition of state court judgments); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (1) (e)
(West 1994).
115. SeeN.D. CT. R. 7.2.
116. The academics are also very active on this issue, giving further guidance
to state and tribal judges. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Un-
ion, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 897-921 (1990); P. S. Deloria & Robert Laurence,
Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation
and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 444-45, (1994); Robert Laurence,
The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and
Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 648-81 (1990);
Robert Laurence, Service of Process and Execution of Judgment on Indian Reservations,
10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 257, 268-78 (1982); Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing
and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy and
Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239 passim (1993); William V. Vetter, Of Tribal
Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 219,
259-69 (1987); Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of
Full Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801, 816-20;
Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1404-24
(1985); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET. AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 343-45 (3d ed. 1991);
DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 603-04 (3d ed. 1993).
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issue because if consensus can be reached there, both tribal and
state court orders will be honored and the reciprocity, which ap-
pears to be at a premium, especially to state legislators, can be
achieved. Additionally, state judicial bodies, and possibly tribal ju-
dicial bodies, are in a better position to implement consensus
achieved through rule making authority rather than having to pre-
sent proposals to legislatures. This is because state legislatures are
often consumed more with the political squabbling surrounding
issues of Indian tribes and their sovereign rights, rather than with
focusing on achievable objectives."7
It is not only important to develop the parameters for the ap-
plication of full faith and credit and comity among state and tribal
courts; it is equally important to develop conventions for the regis-
tration of foreign judgments in the respective court systems and
the dissemination of such orders to the foreign courts. As previ-
ously indicated, this is true even in those areas where federal law
defines the parameters of full faith and credit because federal law is
conspicuously silent on methodology to achieve the federal objec-
tive.1 1 8 Methodology thus left to state and tribal officials, of whom
judges and clerks who deal with registration issues frequently are
the ideal audience to develop the protocols and dissemination
methods, whether they be central registries or simply periodic noti-
fications about tribal and state court orders. Some states appear to
allow tribal court judgments to be filed under the Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act,"9 while others appear to re-
quire the filing of an independent state court action.
20
Full faith and credit is an integral issue to tribal courts because
without it tribal courts lack the credibility and enforcement powers
to truly dispense justice for all litigants. Similarly, it is important to
state courts because of the frequent need to enforce state court
judgments through tribal forums. This issue, if resolved by a tribal-
state court forum, may lay the foundation for future successes on
other fronts.
D. Jurisdictional Agreements
Allocating jurisdiction among state and tribal courts, by con-
117. SeeJones, supra note 104, at 692; see also supra note 113 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
119. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-503 (1997).
120. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 1997).
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sensus, is an area fraught with potential pitfalls and the possibility
for sharp disagreements."' Tribal courts tend to be very jealous
about the exercise of their valid jurisdiction, simply because they
see that jurisdiction as an extension of their sovereignty and ero-
sions upon it as threats to their survival as distinct nations.2 2 Simi-
larly, many state courts may take the position that the exercise of
state court jurisdiction over the entire state achieves a uniform ap-
plication of laws and ensures consistency state wide, securing all the
state's citizens, Indians and non-Indians alike, a similar brand of
justice. 21 In most non-Public-Law-280 states, placing this issue on
an agenda for tribal-state forums is a non sequitur because the
courts have no authority to redraft federal law and vest tribal or
state courts with jurisdiction they may not validly exercise under
federal law,1 24 except in very limited areas, such as the Indian Child
Welfare Act.
1 25
In Public-Law-280 states, however, where jurisdiction between
state and tribal courts is often concurrent, and where confusion
reigns regarding the extent to which state courts can exercise juris-
diction over certain types of disputes, confronting the meddlesome
issue ofjurisdiction allocation may be preferable to ignoring it and
having to adjudicate under unclear judicial precedent. Resolving
jurisdictional ambiguity by consensus may also avoid no-forum is-
sues that have arisen in states such as Minnesota 16 and California1
27
121. SeeJones, supra note 104, at 692.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994). Because of the amendment to Public Law
280 made in 1968 through the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act, state
courts cannot assume further jurisdiction over Indian country absent a valid tribal
election wherein the tribal electorate opts for the extension of state court jurisdic-
tion. See id.; see also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971) (stating
that it is most likely not possible for a state to permit a tribal court to exercise ju-
risdiction beyond its inherent authority because most questions regarding juris-
diction in Indian country are subject matter jurisdiction issues, which cannot be
given by consent).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (1994).
126. See State v. Stone, No. C9-96-1291, 1997 WL 761278, at *6 (Minn. Dec. 11,
1997). Stone outlines several recent Minnesota court decisions restricting state
court jurisdiction over regulatory infractions occurring on state highways running
through several of the Minnesota Chippewa Indian reservations. See id. These
decisions, even if correct, create a quandary for law enforcement because on
many of the reservations involved, the tribes have not acted to regulate highway
safety nor have they vested their courts with the jurisdiction to enforce regulatory
traffic laws.
127. See sources cited supra note 58 (discussing the lack of state court jurisdic-
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and avoid the race to the courthouse door, which always exists in a
concurrent jurisdictional regime. Unlike non-Public-Law-280
states, where the allocation of jurisdiction among state and tribal
courts may be proscribed by federal law, no such impediment exists
in Public-Law-280 states because jurisdictional allocation would in-
volve deferring the exercise of one court's valid jurisdiction to an-
other forum which similarly has valid jurisdiction, rather than cre-
ating jurisdiction out of whole cloth. Several examples of potential
jurisdictional allocation exist, 12 which may be the appropriate topic
for tribal-state court forums.
129
1. Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act130 was enacted by Congress in
1978 to curtail the massive removal of Indian' children from their
homes, 1 2 primarily by state agencies and courts, and to ensure that
tion over eviction actions from housing units located on Indian trust land in Pub-
lic-Law-280 states and the conflict among the federal courts in California as to
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction).
128. See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27
CONN. L. REv. 1055 (1995) (discussing Dormant Commerce Clause and the Su-
preme Court's inconsistent application of tests when applying it to Indian tribes);
Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication In Indian Country: The Confusing Parameter of State,
Federal, Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (1997) (explaining the rules
for state and federal courts to determine the boundaries of their adjudicatory ju-
risdictional powers in lawsuits involving Indian country).
129. See Reynolds, supra note 128. Of course, some tribes, perhaps because of
limited resources, may not be interested in exercising more jurisdiction, which is
of course their prerogative. Even those tribes, however, must realize that because
of the inherent restrictions in Public Law 280, with regard to the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over certain disputes, they must address, in concert with state
judges, the lack of forums to punish offenders and to resolve disputes beyond the
parameters of Public Law 280. See id.
130. See25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
131. The term "Indian," as used in the Indian Child Welfare Act, is a person
who is a member of, or eligible for membership, and the biological child of a
member of, a federally recognized Indian tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (1994).
"Indian" is utilized because in legal parlance the term has been historically used
to refer to the natives who inhabited the North American continent for centuries
prior to the arrival of Europeans, not because it is the proper ethnic description
for Native Americans. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 19-
20 (1982) (recognizing the diversity in the definition of "Indian" while also rec-
ognizing the practical significance of the term).
132. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7531. In certain states with large Native American populations, an incredi-
ble 25 to 35% of native children were removed from their families and placed in
foster care or adoptive homes sometimes during their life. See id. These removal
rates were up to nineteen times greater than the removal rate for non-Indian
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those children who had to be removed would be placed in homes
that reflect their unique cultures and traditions. 3 The Act strives
to keep Indian children in their homes by placing certain proce-
dural requirements on parties in state courts and on the courts
themselves, before the removal of Indian children or the termina-
tion of parental rights.34 It also imposes substantive requirements
upon state courts and social service agencies seeking to place chil-
dren in foster or adoptive care. 35
In those states where state courts could exercise no jurisdiction
over reservation-domiciled Indian children prior. to 1978, the In-
dian Child Welfare Act reaffirms that tribal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving a reserva-
tion-domiciled Indian child. 13 6 Additionally, tribal courts have pre-
children in certain states. See id.
133. See id. In addition to the severe removal rate of Indian children from
their families, Congress was concerned that 85% of Indian children were placed
in non-Indian foster homes, and in the state of Minnesota, for example, 90% of
Indian children in adoptive placements were placed in non-Indian homes. See id.
134. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994) (restricting state court jurisdiction over
Indian children domiciled on Indian reservations; requiring state courts to trans-
fer jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving non-reservation domi-
ciled Indian children to tribal courts; and allowing Indian parents and tribes to
intervene in state court proceedings); 25 U.S.C §1912(a) (1994) (governing in-
voluntary placements by state courts and requiring Indian tribes to receive notice
of proceedings; requiring parents to be appointed counsel; and establishing the
burden of proof and requisite evidentiary showings before a foster care placement
or termination of parental rights can be accomplished in state court); 25 U.S.C. §
1913(c) (1994) (governing the requirements for a voluntary placement of an In-
dian child in foster care or a voluntary termination of parental rights).
135. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36, (1989)
(explaining the substantive requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act accord-
ing to the United States Supreme Court). The most important requirements are
the placement provisions of the act, dictating where Indian children should be
placed in foster and adoptive homes, absent good cause to the contrary, which
.reflect the unique values of Indian culture." 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994); see also 25
U.S.C. § 1915 (1995) (giving the procedure for placing Indian children in foster
care and adoption).
136. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994). The phrase "child custody proceeding"
in domestic relations vernacular is generally thought to mean a custody dispute
between parents in a divorce or other proceeding. See id. Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, custody proceedings between parents are explicitly exempted from
coverage. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994) (exempting custody disputes in divorce
proceedings); see also In re Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 721 (S.D. 1989)
(exempting custody disputes between unwed parents from Indian Child Welfare
Act coverage). Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, the phrase "child custody
proceeding" means any voluntary or involuntary placement of an Indian child
outside his home where custody of the child cannot be regained upon demand
(foster care placement); a proceeding that results in the termination of the pa-
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sumptive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings arising off the
reservation, 137 which proceedings should be transferred to the
tribal courts absent good cause to the contrary.8
There are two areas of the Indian Child Welfare Act very ame-
nable to tribal-state court agreement on the allocation of jurisdic-
tion. First, because the Indian Child Welfare Act recognizes that in
Public-Law-280 states, the state courts will continue to exercise ju-
risdiction over child custody proceedings that arise in Indian coun-
try,139 absent a retrocession of exclusive jurisdiction back to the
tribal court,14 determining which court system, tribal or state,
should exercise initial jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding
arising in Indian country presents an issue ripe for resolution
through a forum. It makes little sense for a state court proceeding
to be commenced and then transferred to a tribal forum under the
provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act 4' if the tribal court has a
competent court of jurisdiction to entertain the action initially.
4 2
Such allocation of jurisdiction agreements is specifically sanctioned
by federal law 43 and may achieve a uniform protocol regarding the
protection of the welfare and culture of Indian children. An ex-
ample may be an agreement made between the courts and social
services agencies of a particular county, located exclusively within
the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, and the tribal
court and social services agency. The agreement would specify
which entity would investigate the alleged abuse and neglect of In-
dian children and which court would be the appropriate forum for
rental rights over an Indian child, either voluntary or involuntary; a placement
after termination of parental rights but prior to adoption; and lastly an adoptive
placement. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (i-iv) (1994).
137. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 36.
138. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994).
139. See25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994).
140. See 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1994) (authorizing a tribe to petition the Depart-
ment of Interior to reassume exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
arising within Indian country); see also Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 918 F.2d
797, 808-11 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that Public Law 280 did not deprive tribal
courts of their inherent concurrentjurisdiction over child custody proceedings).
141. See25 U.S.C. §1911(b).
142. It is the author's understanding that several of the Tribes in Minnesota
and the state are attempting to address issues surrounding jurisdiction and other
important factors in implementing the Indian child Welfare Act in Minnesota
through a cooperative social services agreement.
143. See 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (1994). The Indian Child Welfare Act specifically
authorizes state and tribal courts to enter into agreements for the allocation of
jurisdiction to implement the act. See id.
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the initiation of a petition to protect the child.
The second appropriate topic under the Indian Child Welfare
Act for resolution by judicial agreements is the transfer of jurisdic-
tion issues involving off-reservation children, and in Public-Law-280
states, on-reservation children. Although such agreements cannot
supersede the right of an Indian parent to object to a transfer to
tribal court,1" many state and tribal courts have reached under-
standings regarding the transfer of jurisdiction issues. Some state
courts have even allowed tribal courts to utilize their courtrooms




Another area where state and tribal judges can perhaps reach
a consensus regarding an appropriate allocation of jurisdiction is• • 1. • 146
where the state and tribal court have concurrent jurisdiction. In
these cases prudence dictates that either the tribal court or the
state court first address the issue involved in the litigation. The ex-
ercise of state court jurisdiction would impair the ability of the
Tribe to make its own laws and to be governed by them, or in the
case of tribal court jurisdiction, would result in the tribal adjudica-
tion of a case without the aid of tribal substantive law. 147 Again, the
144. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994) (giving a natural parent of an Indian child
the absolute right to veto a transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court). See generally
Matter of Appeal of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-6982, 922 P.2d 319,
324 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that even though the natural mother of a child
was schizophrenic and the guardian ad litem for her consented to transfer, court
erred in transferring case to tribal court over mother's objections).
145. The author represented an Indian tribe from Alabama, the Mowa Band
of Choctaw Indians, which successfully gained a transfer of jurisdiction over a
proceeding pending in Hughes County, South Dakota, where the tribal court was
allowed to conduct a hearing in the Hughes County Courthouse after transfer.
But seeYavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding that tribal court could not sit outside of its jurisdiction).
146. See e.g., Granite Valley Ltd. Partnership v. Jackpot Junction Bingo & Ca-
sino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 142 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. April 15, 1997)
(discussing the nature of the relationship between state and tribal courts where
concurrent jurisdiction over an action exists in Minnesota, and under federal law)
147. For example, in Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court
held in a suit against a tribal entity (a corporation created to operate the Tribe's
casino) involving activities that occurred both on and off the reservation, that the
prudential rule of abstention did not require the state court to stay its hand on
ruling whether the tribal entity could invoke sovereign immunity as a defense.
555 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Minn. 1996) The court then ruled that the tribal entity was
cloaked with immunity in state court. See id. The court, however, strongly sug-
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allocation of jurisdiction in this area would be permissible under
federal strictures if both the state and tribal court can legitimately
claim jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Nothing in federal law,
then, would preclude ajurisdictional allocation protocol.
48
This may be a difficult area about which to reach a consensus,
however, since litigants will always interject interesting nuances
into cases, which may bring the case either within or without the
sphere of cases where prudence may dictate abstention. There-
fore, attempting to identify an agreement-specific case, which
should be subject to abstention, is almost impossible. However,
general policy agreements between state and tribal judges may
serve to facilitate the decision regarding which court should retain
jurisdiction. An example where a tribal court may defer its jurisdic-
tion to a state court would be a case involving a subject matter that
the tribe lacks in its code but the state regulates. For example, if a
non-Indian merchant on an Indian reservation violated clearly es-
tablished state usury laws in extending financing to a tribal mem-
ber, but the Tribe itself does not regulate consumer credit, pru-
dence may dictate that the tribal court defer to the state court for
an action brought against the merchant.149 Abstention may actually
protect tribal members by enlisting the assistance of state consumer
protection laws. Allowing the state court to adjudicate the case
would not impair the tribal courts because they have not been
charged with adjudicating such cases by tribal government.
Other examples may include the enforcement of state educa-
tion or anti-discrimination laws where the gravamen of the com-
plaint does not implicate tribal sovereignty and is clearly based
upon state law in an area where the Tribe has not regulated. In
such cases, especially where the defendant is a non-Indian who may
attempt to challenge tribal jurisdiction over him, deferring to state
gested that there would be appropriate cases involving on-reservation activity
where a state court should stay its hand, notwithstanding the grant ofjurisdiction
to it under Public Law 280, to permit the tribal court to examine the issue first.
See id. at 294. See generally Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535
N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (applying abstention in suit against tribal busi-
ness entity for on-reservation activity).
148. See Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
149. Of course, nothing would prevent the tribal court from applying state law
in adjudicating the case, provided tribal law did not prevent such an incorpora-
tion. This is also assuming that usury laws are not regulatory in nature. If they are
regulatory, the merchant, Indian or non-Indian, may legitimately claim that such
laws do not apply to him.
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court jurisdiction will allow the Indian litigant much more latitude
in applying favorable state law and may save the Tribe the expense
of regulating an area already extensively regulated by state law.
It is too facile to expect, however, that a Tribe or its court sys-
tem may allocate jurisdiction to a state court in order to resolve the
present predicament in many states over the interpretation of Pub-
lic Law 280 and its restrictions on regulatoryjurisdiction. 5 0 These
restrictions are a product of federal law. Even if a tribe and a state
concur that the state courts should be able to apply state regulatory
laws to matters occurring in Indian country, federal law would pro-
hibit this absent a tribal election, TM which is an unlikely occurrence.
Tribes may, however, as perhaps the best alternative, adopt state
regulatory laws as their own and apply their laws in the tribal
courts.
State courts may likewise opt to abstain from exercising their
valid jurisdiction in favor of tribal adjudication in certain cases. As
the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated in Gavle v. Little Six, Inc.,52
abstention by a state court is appropriate when the exercise of state
court jurisdiction would "undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs" 153 or "infringe on the right of Indi-
ans to govern themselves." 154 Interestingly, the rule that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court adopted for assessing the appropriateness of
abstention is the same rule that non-Public-Law-280 states use for
determining whether state courtjurisdiction is precluded. 55
Again, it may be difficult for state and tribal judges to reach a
consensus on the categories of cases that should be subject to ab-
stention in state courts. The parties involved in cases may feel that
prearranged agreements regarding jurisdiction have deprived
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994); see also discussion supra note 7.
151. See 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994). Even if a tribe could allocate regulatory ju-
risdiction to a state under Public Law 280, which is not clear, the amendment to
Public Law 280 in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 requires that any extension
of jurisdiction be voted for by the tribal electorate. See 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994);
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1971) (citing 25
U.S.C. § 1326 (1964)). Therefore, the tribal government or court system is pre-
cluded from conferring jurisdiction on state courts. See id. at 429.
152. 555 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996).
153. Id. at 291 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Agri West v. Koyama Farms, Inc., 933 P.2d 808 (Mont. 1997),
reh'g denied, (March 20, 1997) (establishing the rule of abstention that "when a
tribal court asserts jurisdiction over certain causes of action, we defer to that asser-
tion by applying the doctrine of abstention as a matter of comity").
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them of forums they are entitled to under federal law, claiming it is
very difficult to apply general principles of agreement to unique
fact situations. Additionally, state courts may be troubled by what
they perceive as a dearth of tribal substantive law in a particular
area and may hesitate to defer to a court with no clear statutory
guidance. As with potential tribal court abstention cases, however,
there are some cases where state court abstention may be appro-
priate.
State courts could review federal court decisions discussing the
exhaustion of the tribal court remedies rule to determine which
cases should be subject to abstention. 5 6 For example, if the resolu-
tion of the underlying dispute involves interpretation of the tribal
law, there seems to be an emerging consensus among federal
courts to defer to tribal courts even if federal court jurisdiction may
appropriately lie in a case. Examples include questions regarding
the legality of tribal gaming management contracts under tribal
law, even where the parties previously agreed to arbitration and
federal court jurisdiction;5 7 cases involving the application of fed-
eral and state labor laws to tribal governmental entities;'5s cases in-
volving whether a tribe has waived its sovereign immunity under
tribal law;59 cases involving the interpretation of tribal constitu-
tional law;16° and cases where a tribal governmental entity or busi-
156. Of course, a distinction between the federal court exhaustion rule and
the state court abstention rule may be that the federal courts assume they have
the ultimate authority to review tribal court decisions in exhaustion cases, whereas
it is unclear under what authority a state court would review anew a case adjudi-
cated through the tribal court, especially in a state that has adopted some form of
full faith and credit for tribal court orders.
157. See Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412, 1421-22
(8th Cir. 1996).
158. See Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1217, 1223-24 (D. Minn. 1995)
(requiring exhaustion in suit against tribal entity for violating ERISA).
159. See Davis v. Mille Lacs Band, No. 5-95-187, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. Jan. 16,
1996) (granting a stay). In Davis, the federal district court judge, when con-
fronted with an argument that the Tribe had voluntarily waived its immunity from
suit in a sexual harassment lawsuit by agreeing to a cross-deputization law en-
forcement agreement with the State, abstained to allow the tribal court to first de-
cide the question. See id. This is not to suggest that a state court should stay its
hand every time an Indian tribe or one of its entities invokes sovereign immunity
in a dispute where state court jurisdiction clearly lies. However, if the argument
surrounding the waiver of immunity involves interpretations of tribal constitu-
tional or statutory law rather than abrogation by the federal government, absten-
tion may be appropriate to permit tribal courts to first resolve the issue.
160. See Basil Cook Enter., v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir.
1997) (declining to interpret tribal constitution to determine whether presiding
tribal court judge was appointed in violation of the trial court constitution).
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ness is involved but the suit does not address any off-reservation ac-
tivity, thus implicating only tribal law."'
Another type of dispute where circumspection may ordain
state court abstention is one involving purely intramural tribal gov-
ernmental issues such as eligibility for enrollment with a tribe or
eligibility to participate in tribal income distributions.1 6 1 Since eli-
gibility for tribal enrollment is oftentimes implicated by paternity
establishment, some state courts have also chosen to defer their ju-
risdiction to resolve paternity issues to tribal courts. A Minnesota
appellate court refused to do so, however, holding that a state
court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the paternity of a child born to
reservation-domiciled Indian parents."
Of course, determining state court abstention in any of these
161. See Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379, 380-81
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995). But see Dacotah Properties-Richfield. Inc. v. Prairie Island
Indian Community, 520 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
state court can apply state law to determine legality of a tribe's contracts off reser-
vation when tribe has waived immunity); Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Delta
Devel., 281 N.W.2d 377, 380-84 (Minn. 1979) (allowing suit against tribal housing
authority where tribe waived immunity).
162. See Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (D. Minn. 1995) (stating
that federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over dispute involv-
ing eligibility for tribal per capita gaming proceed distributions). But see Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Poodry, 85 F.3d 874, 895-97 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that federal court jurisdiction lies to determine the legality of Tribe's banishment
of tribal members).
163. See, e.g., State v. Zaman, 927 P.2d 347, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
that tribal interests were infringed by state court's determination of paternity of
white father of Indian child conceived on reservation); State ex rel. Dep't of Hu-
man Services v. Whitebreast, 409 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Iowa 1987) (holding that state
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for child support action against Indian
father);Jackson ex rel. Smoker v. Smoker, 459 S.E.2d 789, 791 (N.C. 1995) (stating
that state and tribal courts had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction and that
tribal court, who exercised jurisdiction first, retained jurisdiction).
164. See Becker County Welfare Dep't v. Bellcourt, 453 N.W.2d 543, 544
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990). The court held that Public Law 280 vested state courts
with the authority to adjudicate paternity actions arising on the reservations, ex-
cept Red Lake, involving reservation-domiciled Indians. See id. The court based
this conclusion on a belief that the Minnesota Chippewa Tribal Constitution does
not permit the constituent bands to create court systems. See id. This position was
later refuted by the Department of Interior. See Letter from Thomas C. Jacobs,
Office of the Solicitor for the United States Department of the Interior, to Anne
McKieg, Assistant Hennepin County (Minnesota) Attorney (July 18, 1995) (on file
with author). In light of the Department of Interior's switch in position, and if
the tribal courts are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over paternity actions
through tribal legislative action, this case may well be worth revisiting. See id.
(stating that "the Associate Solicitor intends to direct a fundamental review of the
existing regulations").
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types of disputes must be tempered by the realization that some
tribal courts in Public-Law-280 states are not fully functioning
courts of general jurisdiction, but remain courts with limited juris-
diction.6 5 If a Tribe has opted not to confer jurisdiction over a par-
ticular subject matter, deferring to the tribal court may be pre-
cluded, although such failure does not necessarily preordain state
court jurisdiction either.1
66
A possible alternative to abstention which has been raised by
some individuals involved in state-tribal court relations is the de-
velopment of a certification of law procedure between state and
tribal courts whereby each can certify a question of law to the other
when necessary to resolve a dispute. 67 At least one state, Arizona,
permits its supreme court to answer questions of state law certified
to it from tribal courts, although that state does not seem to allow
certification to tribal courts. 168 This procedure, which happens
frequently between state and federal courts, may be especially use-
ful in Public-Law-280 states because of Public Law 280's command
that state courts apply any tribal custom or tradition germane to
the dispute that does not conflict with state policy.69 If the state
adopts the revised Uniform State Laws, and the tribe has a similar
procedure, this may hold out some potential for resolving thorny
issues of choice of law. 70 Tribal courts may legitimately fret, how-
165. See Minnesota State Court/Tribal Court Committee, Minutes from Meet-
ing at Prairie Island Community (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The court
descriptions of the tribes of Minnesota, compiled for state courts in the newly
formed tribal-state court forum, indicate that several tribes of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe only have conservation courts that exercise limited jurisdiction.
See id. Other tribal courts, Grand Portage for example, do not exercise jurisdic-
tion over domestic relations matters. See Grand Portage Band of Chippewa, De-
scription of Grand Portage Band of Chippewa Tribal Court (1997) (on file with
the Minnesota State Court/Tribal Court Committee).
166. See State v. Stone, No. C9-96-1291, 1997 WL 761278, at *6 (Minn. Dec. 11,
1997) (finding that Minnesota lacks jurisdiction over violations of certain driving
traffic regulations which occur on the tribe's reservation).
167. See Meeting Minutes of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in Kansas City, Mo. (July 28-Aug. 4, 1995) (on file with
author). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposed an amendment to the Uniform Certification of Laws Act to include
tribal courts as states in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act. See id.
168. See APjz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861 (West 1994).
169. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1994) (applying Indian
liquor laws).
170. See 24 MILLE LAcs BAND STAT. ANN. § 3001 (West 1996) (providing an ex-
ample of a tribal code). The Mille Lacs code permits its court to certify and an-
swer questions. See id.
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ever, that if a certification procedure were implemented, it would
supplant both the abstention doctrine and the exhaustion of tribal
court remedies doctrine by allowing state courts to bypass the more
time-consuming deferral of jurisdiction in exchange for a more
expeditious and efficient way of discovering tribal law.
Allocation of jurisdiction can be a massive undertaking in a
state where jurisdictional disputes have been a sore point for state-
tribal relations. However, if both state and tribal courts undertake
this mission with the objective of ensuring every litigant access to at
least one forum to resolve a dispute, some agreements may be
reached without unnecessarily depriving either court of its jurisdic-
tion necessary to dispense its obligations.
3. Domestic Violence and Child Support
An area that cries out for some judicial dialogue among fed-
eral, state and tribal judges is domestic violence within and across
reservation boundaries. The new federal law on interstate domes-
tic violence has several provisions that implicate federal, tribal and
state court jurisdiction.' For example, the full faith and credit re-
quirement of federal law mandates that the protection orders of
state and tribal courts "be accorded full faith and credit by the
court of another State or Indian tribe and enforced as if it were the or-
der of the enforcing State or tribe"07' Ergo, if an individual who is sub-
ject to a tribal court protection order violates that protection order
within state court jurisdiction, the state court must impose what-
ever criminal or civil sanctions it would for violating a similar state
court protection order.1 7 3 This raises a whole host of intriguing ju-
risdictional problems in both Public Law 280 and non-Public Law
280 states.
In non-Public-Law-280 states, a state court may not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction to prosecute a non-Indian who violates a tribal
court protection order to protect an Indian within Indian coun-
try. 174 The United States Supreme Court has stripped tribal courts
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See State v. Larson, 455 N.W.2d 600, 600 (S.D. 1990) (holding that the
state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute an assault committed within Indian country by
a non-Indian against an Indian); State v. Kuntz, 66 N.W.2d 531, 533 (N.D. 1954)
(finding that the state has no jurisdiction over the crime of killing an Indian's
livestock, where the Indian lives on the reservation). The General Crimes Act has
generally been construed to preclude state court jurisdiction over crimes involv-
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of this criminal jurisdiction.7 There does not seem to be a federal
statute that would allow prosecutions either, although there is a
possibility of federal prosecution for misdemeanors as defined un-
der state law. 176 In such a scenario it may be beneficial to tribal and
state courts to agree that Indian victims of domestic violence in In-
dian country should utilize state courts to gain protection orders
against non-Indian perpetrators to ensure maximum law enforce-
ment for violations, assuming state courts have criminal jurisdiction
to punish a non-Indian violator of a state court protection order
who violates it in Indian country.
7 7
Likewise, in Public-Law-280 states, tribal, state, and federal
courts need to examine how domestic violence will be addressed
within and across reservation boundaries, assuming domestic vio-
lence protection order proceedings, both civil and criminal, are
not regulatory in nature. State judges may be reluctant to impose
criminal sentences on non-Indian violators of tribal court protec-
tion orders, especially in light of the rather unclear nature of tribal
court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, and because state law
may not specifically criminalize the violation of a tribal, as opposed
to a state court protection order. State courts will also inevitably
need the assistance of tribal court officials in prosecuting violations
to lay the foundation for the introduction of necessary evidence,
including the existence of a tribal court protection order.
Adding even more intrigue to this mix in Public Law 280 states
is the import of the new federal crimes of "Interstate Domestic Vio-
ing Indian perpetrators or victims within Indian country. See State v. Greenwalt,
663 P.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Mont. 1983).
175. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 204-05 (1978) (holding
that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try non-
Indians).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). This statute, generally referred to as the
"Assimilative Crimes Act," allows federal courts to assimilate state criminal law in
the prosecution of offenses in Indian country. See id. The statute was applied in a
case involving sentencing guidelines for the crime of burglary. See United States v.
Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1990).
177. See State v. Larson, 455 N.W.2d 600, 601-02 (S.D. 1990) (finding state
lacks jurisdiction over assault action). Applying this rule, the violation of a pro-
tection order is an offense against the court, it would appear that a state court
would have jurisdiction if the victim is not Indian. If the crime is against an In-
dian victim, however, state court jurisdiction may be lacking.
178. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997) (holding that
without express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians exists only in limited circumstances).
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lence""79 and "Interstate Violation of Protection Order."180 These
statutes are designed to federally criminalize interstate domestic
violence, and interstate activity is defined to encompass cross-
reservation activity.'8 ' Thus, if an individual crosses into or out of
Indian country with the intent to violate a protection order provi-
sion prohibiting acts or threats of violence, or to commit an act of
domestic violence, he can be prosecuted for federal interstate do-
mestic violence. The law provides no exception for Public-Law-280
states. This is odd because legislative history reveals that the law
was premised on the congressional belief that an individual should
not be able to go into another jurisdiction to violate a protection
order.82 On Public-Law-280 reservations, however, crossing into
Indian country does not always subject a person to a different set of
laws because state law is still applicable.183 Therefore, in certain
states a person who enters or leaves Indian country with the intent
to commit an act of domestic violence could potentially be subject
to prosecution in any of three jurisdictions. 114
The best manner for obviating the potential for cross-
jurisdictional enforcement problems would be for state and tribal
courts to develop a protocol for the immediate registration of for-
eign protection orders with adjoining jurisdictions, both tribal and
state. This would ensure that violations of protection orders out-
side the issuing jurisdiction would be vigorously prosecuted and
pursued with the full enforcement powers of the court that has ju-
risdiction over the violations."' 5 In this way a protection order is-
sued by one court automatically becomes both a state and tribal
court protection order. This would also avoid the necessity of
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
180. See id. § 2262.
181. See id.
182. SeeH.R. REP. No. 103-395, § 211, at 9-12 (1993).
183. Since Public-Law-280 states have criminal jurisdiction on reservations, the
offender who passes over the reservation boundary might still be subject to state
law just as he or she was prior to that act. See Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280,
67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
26 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
184. SeeH.R. REP. No. 103-395, § 211, at 9-12 (1993).
185. The Indian tribes which are part of the Dakota Territory Tribal Chair-
men's Council, including the four Dakota tribes in Minnesota, recently received a
federal grant to develop central registries of protection orders via the Internet so
that information about protection orders can be shared among the tribal courts in
the Council and their law enforcement agencies. Working adjoining state and
county jurisdictions into such a registry, or incorporating tribal court orders into a
state central registry, could be a natural offspring of this development.
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tribes and states having to address the messy question of extradit-
ing a violator back to the issuing court's jurisdiction since extradi-
tion between tribal and state governments is another area crying
out for some clarification.186
Similar discussions can be had with regard to child support en-
forcement across reservation boundaries. The recent welfare re-
form legislation 7 for the first time recognized the ability of states
and tribes to enter into cooperative agreements regarding the en-
forcement of child support obligations. These agreements, which
if approved by the Federal Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, will be substantially funded by the federal government and
will permit states and tribes to agree on areas such as wage with-
holding from tribal employees and the use of both federal and
state tax intercepts to collect support for Indian children. A good
starting point may be the mere acknowledgment by state courts
and officials that the tribal courts will be utilized to enforce sup-
port obligations against tribal employees working within Indian
country, thus eliminating the need for state wage withholding or-
ders, which are always met with resistance by tribal governments
who see them as an attempt to apply state law to Indian tribes.
In summary, the issues that confront state and tribal courts
who wish to improve their interaction are challenging, yet sur-
mountable, provided the necessary level of respect is afforded each
as they go about discussing these important matters. Ideally, these
issues will be the grist of tribal-state court forums, although cer-
tainly it may be more productive to address some of these issues in
a more localized manner such as county to tribe.
III. TRIBAL-FEDERAL FORUMS
Surprisingly, state and tribal judges have experienced more
dialogue regarding issues of mutual concern in recent years than
federal and tribal judges. 8 This is understandable in certain states
186. Absent an extradition agreement or statute, federal law does not compel
state or tribal officials to return fugitives back to state or tribal jurisdiction. See
Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a
state's claim at jurisdiction would interfere with Navajo rights to self-government);
City of Farmington v. Benally, 892 P.2d 629, 631-32 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
(dismissing a case and holding that the arrest of an Indian on a reservation is ille-
gal and the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(7) (1994).
188. For example, a senior circuit court judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals wrote that until recently, and without the dialogue between state and
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where state courts exercise paramount jurisdiction in Indian coun-
try."" However, in states that don't follow Public Law 280, where
the federal courts exercise a substantial degree of criminal and civil
jurisdiction exclusive of the authority of state courts, the dialogue
between federal and tribal judges is just as essential. This may ex-
plain why both federal' 90 and tribal judges'9' in the Eighth Circuit
have recently initiated discussions about the formation of a tribal-
federal judges' committee to discuss the interrelationship of the
tribal and federal courts. 92 Just as with state and tribal judicial dia-
logue, the federal and tribal judges are broaching the subjects at
hand with a certain degree of curiosity about how~each court sys-
tem operates, and with circumspection with regard to what can be
accomplished. Just as with state and tribal judges, perhaps the
most important objective of tribal and federal court forums should
be the educational aspect whereby federal judges can learn about
the types of caseloads tribal courts encounter and the severe budg-
etary constraints under which they operate.9 The tribal judges,
conversely, may be enlightened by the opportunity to participate in
the educational sessions federal judges attend and by the federal
criminal and civil court processes. Other, more concrete, issues
present themselves as likely targets of federal-tribal court dialogue
and will be discussed in the following sections.
A. Tribal Court Exhaustion Rule
In two seminal decisions, 94 the United States Supreme Court
injected some much needed vitality into tribal court adjudicatory
tribal courts, "the typical federal judge would not have had a view of all of tribal
courts beyond a dim awareness of their existence." J. William C. Canby, Tribal
Courts, Viewed From A Federal Judge's Perspective, 9 TRIBAL COURT REC. 15, 15 (Spring-
Summer 1996). Judge Canby credits state and tribal court forums as laying the
foundation for positive tribal-federal relations. See id.
189. See discussion supra note 2.
190. See discussion supra note 2.
191. The tribal judges in the states represented by the Eighth Circuit, through
the Northern Plains Tribal Judges' Association have endorsed the concept of de-
veloping a working relationship with the federal judges and have created task
forces to develop suggestions for possible topics of discussion.
192. See supra note 2.
193. See supra note 2.
194. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987) (ruling that a
tribal court should have the first opportunity to evaluate the facts); National
Farmer's Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)
(holding that a tribal court should have an opportunity to determine its own ju-
risdiction).
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authority by holding that litigants cannot proceed to federal court
to challenge a tribal court's jurisdiction without first exhausting
tribal court remedies. This rule requiring tribal court exhaustion,
as the Court has indicated recently,' 9' is not mandated by any con-
stitutional or statutory principles, but is the creature of prudence,
designed to strengthen tribal court systems by giving them the op-
portunity to examine their own jurisdiction and the authority of
the Tribes to regulate certain reservation affairs. These decisions
empowered tribal courts by preempting the efforts of litigants try-
ing to avoid tribal court jurisdiction by invoking federal court ju-
risdiction. More contemporary decisions have expanded this pru-
dential doctrine well beyond its original design, to permit tribal
courts to initially resolve a variety of disputes, including actions
brought by the United States government as well as those based on
federal law.'96
From a tribal perspective, however, the tribal court exhaustion
rule is a good news, bad news scenario. It represents the opportu-
nity for tribal courts to initially resolve disputes within the realm of
their jurisdiction. Ultimately, however, the federal courts will de-
termine the appropriate scope of tribal court jurisdiction because
of the Supreme Court's determination in National Farmer's Union
97
that the extent of a tribal court's civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian
litigant is a "federal question," justiciable in federal court under
federal question jurisdiction.'98 Accordingly, regardless of how ef-
fective and just a tribal court is in adjudicating a case, its viability as
the ultimate arbiter of many disputes will depend upon the gener-
osity of the federal courts. Making the federal courts aware of the
workings of tribal courts and developing a collegial relationship
with federal judges is of vital importance to tribal courts. These
tribal court judges wish to remove the cloak of mystery surround-
ing tribal courts and convince the federal courts of the integrity of
their dispute resolution methods.
195. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
196. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 149, 1505 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that tribal court jurisdiction was not so contrary to the Price-Anderson
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994), as to preclude application of the tribal court exhaus-
tion rule). But see Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux
Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that tribes cannot
regulate the transportation of nuclear waste across reservation highways and the
case is not subject to the tribal court exhaustion rule).
197. See National Farmer's Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 857.
198. See28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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The exhaustion rule spawns a cornucopia of issues for federal
and tribal judges to discuss, ranging from the standard of review of
tribal court decisions, l9 to the mechanics for that review. 200 These
issues may prove to be more fruitful subjects for discussion than
the broader issue of which cases should be subject to exhaustion,
an issue which federal judges may feel is not subject to disputation,
but instead is governed by Supreme Court and superior federal
appellate court decisions.
1. Developing a Federal Court Standard of Review for Tribal Court
Decisions
With all the attention devoted in certain states to full faith and
credit between tribes and states, there has been surprisingly little
scrutiny of what degree of deference a federal court owes a tribal
court's resolution of a dispute.20° For example, in a diversity case
arising in Indian country, subject to exhaustion because of Iowa
Mutual,202 if a tribal court renders a fair and just resolution of a dis-
pute based upon tribal law, what role should a federal court play in
reviewing the tribal court's decision? Should the federal court
simply try the case anew, based upon state law thus rendering the
tribal court adjudicatory process superfluous, or should the federal
court merely affirm the tribal court decision, thus arguably denying
199. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19 (holding for the requirement that appel-
lees first exhaust tribal court remedies before appealing tribal court jurisdiction to
federal court, but failing to discuss the standard for federal appellate review); Na-
tional Farmers, 845 U.S. at 857 (omitting the standard under which a federal court
should review a tribal court determination of its own jurisdiction).
200. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19; National Farmers, 845 U.S. at 857.
201. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a federal court need not give full faith and credit to a tribal court judgment,
but it must provide comity).
202. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 15-16.
203. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that
federal courts are bound in diversity cases to apply the substantive law of the state
where the action arose). If state law conflicts with tribal law, however, a federal
judge may be in a quandary because it makes little sense to apply the law of a fo-
rum to a dispute, when that forum has no relation to the cause of action. How-
ever, that seems to be the prevailing trend in federal court diversity cases and fed-
eral tort claims cases arising in Indian country. See id.; see also Red Elk v. United
States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine if
tribal officer who raped youth while on duty was engaged in his course of em-
ployment at time of rape); Big Owl v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 1304, 1309
(D.S.D. 1997) (looking to state law to determine if actions of tribal school board
of not rehiring teacher rose to level of intentional or emotional infliction of emo-
tional distress).
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the litigants the access to a federal forum the diversity jurisdiction
statute guarantees? Indeed, in those cases where the federal courts
have applied the exhaustion rule to a dispute amenable to ultimate
resolution under tribal law, it is conceivable that the federal courts
may ultimately adopt a rule similar to the federal abstention doc-
trine,0 4 as applied to pending state litigation, to avoid rehearing
such disputes in federal courts.
There are a plethora of issues that arise when a federal court
reviews a tribal court decision after tribal court remedies have been
exhausted. Unfortunately, most of the federal court decisions have
discussed cases appropriate for exhaustion and paid less attention
to the role of federal courts after exhaustion. 5 One issue that ap-
pears clear is that federal courts will review any assertion of regula-
tory or adjudicatory authority over a non-Indian litigant anew, ei-
ther under the standard set out in Montana v. United States,..8 or
under the more deferential standard set out in other Supreme
Court precedents, with little preclusive effect to the tribal court's
legal rationale.07
If tribal court jurisdiction is endorsed, however, under what
principle of federal law would a federal court be empowered to
proceed into an analysis of the tribal court's resolution of the mer-
its of a dispute? The federal question raised by a tribal court's as-
sertion ofjurisdiction is the extent to which the court can exercise
the jurisdiction, not whether the exercise of that jurisdiction pro-
duced a just result.08 An example of an actual case pending in the
204. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (upholding the national
policy which forbids federal courts from staying state court proceedings unless
special circumstances exist).
205. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1416 (1997). The United
States Supreme Court decision in A-1 Contractors offers little guidance for tribal
and federal courts. Id. Even though the Court was reviewing a tribal court and
appellate decision, they seemed to pay little or no attention to the tribal court's
findings of fact or reasoning in upholding itsjurisdiction. See id.
206. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (stating the general rule that Indian tribes do
not have authority over the conduct of non-Indians within a reservation, but re-
tain authority only over the relations among tribal members).
207. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978); Duncan En-
ergy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994).
208. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71. In Santa Clara, the United States
Supreme Court held that allegations of tribes violating due process rights under
the Indian Civil Rights Act are only justiciable in federal court through habeas
corpus, and not in an independent action to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Id. This ruling would appear to preclude the federal courts from reviewing tribal
court decisions alleging due process violations in tribal court proceedings. In
Duncan Energy Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
[Vol. 24
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss2/2
1998] TRIBAL-STATE & TRIBAL-FEDERAL COURT RELATIONS 503
Crow Tribal Court, which was the subject of a recent Ninth Circuit
opinion, is Burlington Northern Railroad v. Red Wolf20 9 If a Crow jury
enters a substantial verdict against a non-Indian railroad based
upon a system of justice which is arguably biased, 10 yet the Tribe as
well as its court system clearly had jurisdiction over the railroad,
which appears likely because of a previous Ninth Circuit decision,
what is the federal court to do in its review of the tribal court deci-
sion? The danger of allowing the federal court to review all the
stated that federal courts should not review the merits of a dispute that is properly
within tribal courtjurisdiction. 27 F.3d at 1300. They seemed to preclude federal
court review of the merits of a dispute in tribal court by stating in dicta: "Once
tribal remedies have been exhausted, the Tribal Court's determination of tribal
jurisdiction may be reviewed in the federal district court. However, unless a fed-
eral court determines that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, ... proper defer-
ence to the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised ... and re-
solved in the Tribal Court." Id. (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,
19 (1987)).
209. 106 F.3d 868, 869 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a district court cannot
enjoin tribal proceedings unless tribal remedies have first been exhausted), va-
cated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997). The Supreme Court vacated the decision for recon-
sideration in light of A-i Contractors v. Strate, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). It is unclear
why the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in Burlington North-
ern for reconsideration in light of A-1 Contractors, since Burlington Northern did not
involve the issue of when a tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over a non-
Indian, but only whether a non-Indian can utilize a federal forum to enjoin a
tribal court's exercise of civil jurisdiction prior to exhausting tribal court reme-
dies. Perhaps the Supreme Court expects the Ninth Circuit to determine whether
the invocation of tribal court jurisdiction in Burlington Northern is being made in
"bad faith," which would trigger an exception to the tribal court exhaustion rule.
See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
n.21 (1985). However, the Court itself expressly rejected an argument in Iowa
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante that a litigant can avoid exhaustion by arguing
bias or incompetence of the tribal forum. 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
210. See Burlington Northern, 106 F.3d at 872. According to the dissenting opin-
ion in this case, the tribal jury, before being impaneled, was instructed in Crow by
a Crow appellate judge to remember the Crows killed by the railroads throughout
the history of the invasion of the Crow nation. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
The dissent also claimed that most of the jurors eventually impaneled were re-
lated to the plaintiffs and the decedents. See id. (Kleinfeld dissenting); see also
Crash History Boosts Plaintiffs' Case in Wrongful Death Trial, 10 INSIDE LITIG. 4, 4-5
(1996) (describing history of the Red Wolfcase).
211. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the Blackfeet Tribe had the authority to tax the railroad's
rights-of-way running through the reservation). Given the United States Supreme
Court's recent declaration that the extent of a tribal court's adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion should be based upon the tribe's regulatory jurisdiction, this decision ap-
pears to doom the railroad's argument that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction
over it for a tort that occurred at one of its rights-of-way on the Crow reservation.
See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1416 (1997).
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particulars of a tribal court decision is that tribal courts will be-
come inferior courts subject to unlimited federal court review, a re-
sult which will denigrate the tribal courts in the eyes of non-Indian
litigants who will perceive tribal courts as forums to "dry-run" litiga-
tion, thus hindering the development of tribal law. Yet, it may be
equally harmful for a federal court to be stripped of the authority
to overturn blatant violations of tribal law because the merits of a
particular resolution may color a federal court's decision on
whether a tribal court could exercise jurisdiction ab initio. Thus a
tribal court may lose its otherwise valid jurisdiction because of a
federal court's need to overturn a biased application of tribal law.
Conversely, there may be cases where the tribal court's resolu-
tion of the merits is so laudable that it may sway a federal court's
interpretation of tribal regulatory authority. Such a case is City of
Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 2 wherein the court re-
fused to follow one of its precedents 2 3 and held that Indian tribes
were vested with the authority by Congress to regulate the sale of
liquor by non-Indians within the exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation. The Eighth Circuit endorsed the notion that federal
courts should not second-guess tribal interpretations of tribal law,
even if the issue dealt with jurisdiction over non-members.1
It is equally unclear how the federal courts will deal with tribal
court application of federal substantive law, if the tribal court had
212. 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Isabel
City Package Liquor, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6087 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Ct. Jan 8, 1991) (holding that the Tribe had authority to require a business li-
cense). The tribe's court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Dupree American Legion Club, No. -, slip op. at
- (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1992).
213. See United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 170-71 (8th Cir. 1980)
(applying the limited definition of "Indian country" found in 18 U.S.C. §§
1154(c), 1156 (1994), which excludes fee-patented lands in non-Indian communi-
ties from the definition of "Indian country)."
214. See 10 F.3d at 558 (interpreting the scope of the term "Indian country").
215. See id. at 559. The court, in response to the argument of the non-Indian
liquor stores that the tribe's constitution prevented the exercise of jurisdiction
over non-Indians, stated: "The tribal courts interpreted the constitutional lan-
guage as allowing the tribal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the appel-
lees and we defer to the tribal courts' interpretation, even though non-Indians are
involved." Id.; see also Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)
(noting that tribal courts are recognized as appropriate forums for disputes affect-
ing important personal interests of Indians and non-Indians); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (recognizing that promotion of tribal govern-
ment and self-determination requires granting the tribal court the full opportu-
nity to determine its own jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. If, in those cases that
arise under federal law are nonetheless consigned to initial tribal
court review,1 6 the federal courts take the perspective that the
tribal court fact-finding process and judgment is entitled to no re-
gard in the ultimate decision, the exhaustion rule is wasting the
valuable time of tribal courts and the litigants who are being
charged with relitigating every case anew in federal court. Tribal
courts are not strengthened by a doctrine that requires them to de-
vote substantial time and effort to the resolution of an issue, only to
see the federal court ignore their decisions.
Federal and tribal judges have a mutual investment in applying
the exhaustion doctrine so as to lessen the litigation burden on
both the courts and the litigants. Nothing prevents tribal and fed-
eral judges from doing this by agreement, rather than by attempt-
ing to discern what the other is thinking through their judicial de-
cisions. The federal courts may want to adopt some type of
preclusion rule for tribal law issues fully and fairly litigated in tribal
court,217 similar to the preclusion rule that exists in federal court
litigation implicating already-litigated issues in state courts.2 18 Such
a rule would not prevent a federal court from relitigating a claim
founded solely on tribal law properly brought before it as a chal-
lenge to tribal court adjudicatory authority, if the tribal court proc-
ess is grossly unfair to one of the litigants, similar to the rule allow-





216. See cases cited and discussion supra notes 14 and 16.
217. See, e.g., Basil Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 66 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding that the federal court should not address the argument that
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Court is a nullity under the tribal constitution be-
cause it would require the court to construe tribal law); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding it unnecessary to
decide whether an action was attributable to the tribe as a governmental body).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
219. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 315 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1963). The only
potential problem with this assertion of federal court jurisdiction was pointed out
by the Ninth Circuit in response to an argument that the federal court could re-
view a tribal court decision for a determination of whether it complies with the
due process clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act, where the court noted: "[t]his
due process review would be unavailable if appellants later prevail on their argu-
ment that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 (1978), precludes private
enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), in federal court."
Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 870 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118
S. Ct. 37 (1997).
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Currently the Ninth,220 Tenth,22' and Eighth Circuits222 have is-
sued opinions on the degree of deference owed to tribal court de-
cisions with all three adopting the approach of reviewing legal is-
sues, with regard to the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction, de
novo and accepting tribal findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Such a standard avoids the necessity of relitigating factual issues in
federal court and thus may be financially advantageous to the liti-
gants. The Eighth Circuit opinions suggest, as does a recent Sec-
ond Circuit decision, however, that determinations of tribal law
should not be reviewed by federal courts.223
2. Preparing the Tribal Court Record for Federal Review
Without an adequate record, tribal courts are risking the pos-
sibility of federal court ignorance of the basis of their decisions re-
garding jurisdiction and other important issues.224 In addition, liti-
220. See FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir.
1990).
221. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "when reviewing tribal court decisions on jurisdictional issues, dis-
trict courts should review tribal courts' findings of fact for clear error and conclu-
sions of law de novo. Although the district court was imprecise as to what stan-
dard it applied in this case, we are satisfied that the court deferred to the tribal
court's findings of fact and reviewed de novo the legal question of tribal jurisdic-
tion over allotted lands").
222. See Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th
Cir. 1994). The Duncan court seemed to preclude federal court review of the
merits of a dispute in tribal court by stating in dicta:
Once tribal remedies have been exhausted, the Tribal Court's determi-
nation of tribal jurisdiction may be reviewed in the federal district court.
However, unless a federal court determines that the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction, proper deference to the tribal court system precludes reliti-
gation of issues raised ... and resolved in the Tribal Court.
Id.
223. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987); Burlington N.
R.R. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 869 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997);
Basil Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1997).
224. This may have been the case in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, where the court
implied that the tribal court record was unclear on the critical issue of whether A-
1 Contractors was performing work on a tribal contract at the time of the acci-
dent. 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997). The tribal appellate court decision, however,
seems to intimate that A-i was engaged in its work under the subcontract at the
time. The problem with the United States Supreme Court penalizing the tribal
court for not making a clear finding on this issue is that the tribal court order de-
nied a motion to dismiss and thus assumed all of the plaintiffs allegations as true.
The court was never allowed to proceed into an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of whether the non-Indian defendant was engaged in the sub-contract work at the
time of the accident. The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
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gants can often slant a record to make it appear that the tribal
court behaved in one way or another.2 2 5  Tribal courts are thus
charged with preparing an adequate record for federal court re-
view in those cases where tribal court jurisdiction is being chal-
lenged. The problem presented to tribal courts is that many of the
decisions they issue that circulate back to federal court involve mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 226 These hearings often
lack the development of evidence for which the federal courts are
looking. The federal courts, thus, may wish to defer their jurisdic-
tion to permit the necessary development of the factual record in
the tribal court,2' even when the underlying federal cause of action
centers around an alleged arrogation of jurisdiction by the tribal
court. These cases need to be addressed on general principles,
perhaps, and not on a case by case basis. This is true because in
many of the federal court challenges to tribal court jurisdiction,
the tribal judge is listed as the defendant in federal court, thereby
ethically precluding the federal judge from engaging the tribal
court about its record.2
3. Determining What Law to Apply in Federal Court when
Eighth Circuit rely heavily upon the role of the tribal courts as the finders of fact
in these cases. See Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294,
1299 (8th Cir. 1994). In Duncan Energy Co., the Court observed: "[t]hus, the re-
quirement of tribal exhaustion contemplates the development of a factual record
that will serve the 'orderly administration of justice in the federal court.'" Id. at
1300 (quoting National Farmer's Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 845, 856 (1985)).
225. See Burlington Northern 106 F.3d at 872. Burlington Northern held out the
tribal record as proof that a Crow elder instructed the jury before being impan-
eled to punish the railroad for previous deaths it had caused on the reservation.
See id.
226. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11; National Farmers, 845 U.S. at 847.
227. For example, the federal court that is presently reviewing whether the
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court has jurisdiction over the makers of Crazy Horse malt
liquor issued an order staying the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction, yet di-
rected the tribal court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of the con-
tacts the brewery had with the reservation. See Hornell Brewing v. Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Court, No. 96-3028, slip op. at 10 (D.S.D. Dec. 3, 1996) (enjoining the
tribal court from proceeding on the merits). That order was subject to an appeal
by the Crazy Horse estate and tribe who claim that the federal judge should not
have intervened until the tribal court was permitted to develop the record. The
appeals court held that the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court lacked adjudicatory out-
side the Rosebud Sioux Reservation. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Court, No. 97-1242, 1998 WL 9176, at *6 (8th Cir.Jan. 14, 1998).
228. See e.g., A-1 Contractors, 17 S. Ct. at 1408 (naming tribal courts judge as a
defendant in an appeal).
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Reviewing Tribal Court Adjudications or Actions of Tribal Entities
Another troublesome issue that must be confronted by federal
judges who are faced with challenges to tribal court adjudications is
what law to apply in determining whether the tribal court exceeded
its jurisdiction or violated federal or tribal law in rendering its ver-
dict. This may not prove a difficult task in a case where a litigant
challenges the tribe's exercise of regulatory authority or the extent
of the tribal court's adjudicatory authority because there are some
settled principles laid out by the United States Supreme Court to
guide the federal court. However, when the underlying dispute
arises under the diversity statute,
229 the Federal Tort Claims Act,
20
or a mix of federal and tribal law, federal courts may be bound by
principles of stare decisis, which make little sense in the tribal con-
text. For example, in a diversity case, the federal court is charged
to apply the substantive law of the state where the cause of action
arose.23 1 Doing so in a case challenging a tribal court's disposition
of a diversity case is not appropriate, however, if tribal substantive
law governed the actions of the litigants. 32 To apply state law
means to judge the actions of the litigants by standards that did not
apply to them, a fundamentally unfair notion.
Similarly, in a case brought against the United States because
of a tort committed by a tribal actor, applying state substantive law
may be maladroit because the tribal law on a particular issue may
differ from the state law.233 The existence of tribal law on a particu-
229. 28 U.S.C § 1332 (1994).
230. Id. § 1346(b).
231. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
232. See Standing Rock Hous. Auth. v. Home Indem. Co., No. __, slip op. at 1
(Standing Rock Sioux Sup. Ct. December 13, 1993) (dismissing appeal). The
author was involved in a case raising this interesting predicament. After a tribal
court dismissed a wrongful death action on a statute of limitations grounds, which
was affirmed by the tribal appellate court, the plaintiff proceeded into federal
court on the basis of diversity and the federal judge applied the longer statute of
limitations of the state where the action arose to find that the case was still viable.
After the case was then settled in federal court, it made its way back to the tribal
court when the insurer of the defendant was sued in federal court under causes of
action arising under tribal law. The tribal court applied the doctrine of res judi-
cata to find that the litigation was concluded in federal court. See id.
233. See Big Owl v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D.S.D. 1997)
(applying South Dakota law to determine whether a tribal school board inten-
tionally or negligently inflicted emotional distress by not hiring back a teacher);
see also Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
South Dakota state law to determine whether tribal police officer who raped a
minor child while on duty was engaged in the course of his employment).
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lar subject matter may not be readily accessible by a tribal judge,
however, in the context of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act because such cases are not subject to the exhaustion require-
ment to which diversity and other cases are subjected. 34 This is one
area where a federal judge may wish to certify a question of tribal
law to the tribal court, similar to the process by which the federal
courts certify state law questions to a state's highest court."'
The tribal court exhaustion rule has created a myriad of diffi-
cult questions regarding the role of the federal district court in re-
viewing a tribal court decision to determine whether the tribal
court had jurisdiction and properly applied federal law. Many of
these issues will have to be resolved ultimately by federal appellate
courts and possibly by the United States Supreme Court. Pending
that, however, the tribal and federal judges in a particular area may
wish to discuss these issues in an effort to avert the potential prob-
lems that arise when one court is designated as the primary forum
to develop the evidentiary record and another as the primary fo-
rum to resolve the underlying federal issues of jurisdiction when
neither is inferior to the other.
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction Issues
Just as there are cases where state and tribal courts may exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction over Public-Law-280 reservations, fre-
quently cases arise where both the tribal and federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over a criminal action, and less frequently over
a civil action, that arises in Indian country in a non-Public-Law-280
state. Typically, these involve cases that the tribal court entertains
initially, but then result in either a federal indictment or com-
plaint, thus shifting the focus to the federal forum. These cases are
distinguishable from the cases where tribal court exhaustion is
mandated because in these cases the federal courts need not defer
their jurisdiction to allow tribal court initial adjudication. How-
ever, they similarly present a fertile field for tribal-federal dialogue.
Unfortunately, at present no mechanism exists to transfer a case
234. See Louis v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 456, 459-60 (D.N.M. 1997)
(holding that that exhaustion requirement does not apply to action governed by
the Federal Tort Claims Act); see also United States v. Yakima Tribal Ct. of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 794 F.2d 1402, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that tribal
court lacks jurisdiction over federal employees and the federal government).
235. See Perkins v. Clark Equip. Co., 823 F.2d 207, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1987)
(explaining when a federal court should certify a case to a state or tribal court).
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from tribal to federal court when a federal issue arises which is not
subject to the tribal court exhaustion rule. Thus, federal and
tribal courts must adjudicate so as to not step on each other's toes.
One area where federal courts typically handle matters previ-
ously heard by tribal courts involve criminal prosecutions where an
Indian defendant appeared before the tribal court and entered a
plea to a lesser-included offense in the federal prosecution. The
federal courts are obviously distressed over how to deal with often
non-counseled guilty pleas entered in tribal court which, although
they may meet the standard for a voluntary plea under the Indian
Civil Rights Act, which does not guarantee court-appointed coun-
sel, does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to the United States
237Constitution. The Ninth Circuit held that an uncounseled guilty
plea should be inadmissible in federal court,38 except for im-
2390peachment purposes" Because of United States v. Wheeler,240 the
double jeopardy clause does not bar a subsequent prosecution in
federal court for criminal conduct previously prosecuted in tribal
241court, nor vice versa.
Some tribal judges may wish to have the pleas entered before
them granted as much weight in federal court as possible. Others
may wish that pleas entered in tribal court be ignored by federal
judges. This may be an issue for the federal and tribal judges to
discuss because tribal judges are more likely to be confronted with
pro se defendants in tribal court questioning. The Tribal/Federal
court discussion should include what impact a tribal plea will have
if the defendant is indicted in federal court. Few tribal judges
would like to be in a position of accepting a plea in tribal court af-
ter advising the pro se defendant, erroneously perhaps, that his or
her plea will have no impact in federal court.
Persons who are still in the "constructive" custody of the fed-
236. See Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777, 780-81 (10th Cir. 1990); Weso v.
Menominee Indian Sch. Dist., 915 F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D. Wisc. 1995); White Tail v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 915 F. Supp. 153, 154 (D.N.D. 1995).
237. See U.S. CONST. amend VI.
238. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that because the plea would have been unconstitutional in federal court, it should
not be used as a statement against an interest in federal court and that such a rul-
ing does not impugn the integrity of tribal court process).
239. See United States v. Denetclaw, 96 F.3d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1996), cert de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 1014 (1997); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 91 F.3d 1285, 1288 (9th
Cir. 1996).
240. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
241. See id at 316-22.
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eral courts, because of their status as probationers, frequently ap-
pear in tribal court on tribal charges that may result in the revoca-
tion of the federal probation. Tribal courts may not be aware of
the status of these people when they appear before them and thus
may not fully advise them of the ramifications of a plea of guilty.
Dialogue between the federal officials and the tribal courts will
thus aid the tribal courts in protecting the rights of accused per-
sons who come before them.
Yet another area which has generated some recent attention
from the federal courts, and quite possibly some justifiable concern
from a tribal perspective, are issues regarding the violation of tribal
law by federal actors investigating crimes on Indian reservations.2
Many federal criminal violations arising on Indian reservations are
initially investigated and prosecuted by tribal officials charged with
complying with tribal law and the Indian Civil Rights Act. Their
investigative activities may lead to the laying of federal charges,
however, which shifts the focus from tribal law to federal law. Two
recent federal court decisions have endorsed the proposition that
violations of tribal law cannot be utilized to suppress evidence ob-
tamined in apparent compliance with federal requirements. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Hornbeck,43 the court upheld the admis-
sion of evidence in federal court obtained by tribal police in
violation of tribal law.2" The court did so on the basis that federal
standards govern the admission of evidence in federal court and
the violation of tribal law was irrelevant.
Additionally, in United States v. Dohety,245 the court upheld the
admission of a confession elicited from a suspect in a tribal jail who
was not represented by counsel but had obtained a continuance for
an arraignment in tribal specifically so he could retain counsel.
The court held that the invocation of the right to retain counsel in
tribal court did not trigger the right to remain silent or the right to
counsel in federal court because federal charges had not yet been
242. See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 772-73 (6th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to suppress a confession elicited in violation of tribal law); United States
v. Hornbeck, 188 F.3d 615, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to suppress evidence ob-
tained in violation of tribal search warrant requirement).
243. 118 F.3d at 617.
244. The tribal police officers failed to file a return to the search warrant
within the tribally prescribed period of time leading the tribal judge to suppress
evidence obtained.
245. 126 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1997).
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laid at the time the confession was elicited. 46
Although these decisions may be sound as matters of federal
constitutional law, they do implicate delicate issues impacting
tribal-federal court relations, especially when they seem to condone
violations of tribal law by tribal and federal officers who theoreti-
cally are bound by tribal law when conducting investigations re-
garding tribal law violations.
Another type of concurrent jurisdiction issue which has been
the subject of some recent attention has been the adjudication of
child sexual abuse cases arising in Indian country.247 These cases
demand cooperation between federal and tribal judges because,
although the perpetrators may eventually be prosecuted and incar-
cerated by the federal courts, the tribal courts are frequently called
upon initially to protect the child from the perpetrator, especially
if the perpetrator is a family member or a person in the community
with easy access to the child. 24 Tribal courts also provide the nec-
essary services after the offense through child dependency and ne-
glect proceedings or through tribal criminal proceedings.
Potential issues which need to be resolved include: 1) tribal
courts ensuring that the perpetrators do not gain access to the
children victims, either personally or through other family mem-
bers, before trial to protect the integrity of the child's testimony in
the federal proceedings; 2) federal courts and officials notifying
tribal court officials when perpetrators are released from pre-trial
detention back to the reservation community; 3) federal-tribal co-
ordination on investigating the crimes to ensure minimal emo-
tional trauma to the child, and coordination on procuring the tes-
timony of the child and post-trial victim impact statements; 4)
ensuring the privacy of the mental health records of victims in
tribal court files, when those records are not relevant to the de-
fense of the perpetrator yet may be used to harass the child victim
on the stand, possibly by federal courts making such files subject to
federal protection orders until the federal judge can determine
their relevancy; and 5) federal officials notifying tribal courts and
tribal officials when sexual perpetrators are released from federal
246. See id.
247. The Federal Judicial Center conducted a joint training session for tribal
and federal judges in the 10th Circuit on this topic. See Training Session for
Tribal and Federal Judges in the 10' Circuit in Denver, CO (Sept. 9-11, 1996) (on
file with author).
248. See 18 U.S.C. 2243 (1994).
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detention back into the tribal community. All of these issues serve
to protect Indian children, already traumatized by being victim-
ized, from further horrors.
C. Prosecution of Non-Indians for Misdemeanors Committed against
Indians In Indian Country
A last issue, which has been in vogue recently on some reserva-
tions, is the dedication of more federal court resources to deal with
the problem of non-Indians committing misdemeanors, such as
spouse abuse or issuing bad checks, against Indian victims in In-
dian country. State courts are precluded from exercising jurisdic-
tion over such offenses under the General Crimes Act,2 49 and tribal
court jurisdiction has been deemed to be incompatible with their
status as subjects of the federal government.' Federal prosecutors,
busy with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps
have been remiss in devoting the necessary attention to the prob-
lems that arise when non-Indians commit offenses in Indian coun-
try, oftentimes with apparent impunity. At least one federal dis-
trict, North Dakota, saw this as a serious enough problem to have
several meetings about the topic.2 5' The Chief Judge of the district,
the Honorable Rodney Webb, proposed and implemented a sug-
gestion that one of the federal magistrates in that state be made a
full-time magistrate to deal with crimes committed by non-Indians
in Indian country. 52 Likewise, a reservation in Oregon, the Warm
Springs reservation, in conjunction with the United States Attorney
for Oregon, the tribal court and the federal district court, estab-
lished the first United States Magistrate Court located on an Indian
reservation on June 9, 1995 to deal with non-Indian offenders.2 '53
The federal government provides the magistrate, the U.S. Attorney
249. See State v. Larson, 455 N.W.2d 600, 601-02 (S.D. 1990) (holding that
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over an offense committed in Indian
country by a non-Indian).
250. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978)
(holding that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try
and punish non-Indians, and hence may not assume such jurisdiction unless spe-
cifically authorized to do so by Congress).
251. See Report of John Schneider, United States Attorney for the District of
North Dakota, Crimes Arising Out of Indian Country (April 18, 1997) (submitted
to the North Dakota Supreme Courts' Committee on Tribal State Court Affairs)
(on file with author).
252. See id.
253. See Kristine Olson & Tim Simmons, Overview of the U.S. Attorney's Role in
Tribal Courts, 9 TRIBAL COURT REc. 18, 19 (Spring-Summer 1996).
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and the tribal court the facility for the functioning of the court.M
Further initiatives in this area can only serve to improve the work-
ing relationships of federal and tribal judges and to protect the
tribal community.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because this article commenced with a quote from a respected
non-Indian jurist, it is perhaps only fair to conclude with a quote
from a renowned Indian 'jurist,, 5 1 the Hunkpapa Lakota leader,
Sitting Bull, who advised his people: "Let us put our minds to-
gether and see what kind of life we can build for our children.
255
The same admonition applies to tribal, state and federal judges
who are charged with resolving disputes that arise in Indian coun-
try. These judges will eventually determine the legal climate under
which future generations, both Indian and non-Indian, will live to-
gether. This article attempted to examine some of the issues that
concern tribal, state and federal judges who preside over ajudicial
landscape where the rules appear confusing and ever changing. In
no way is this list of topics exhaustive of the varied and sundry is-
sues that confront these jurists. However, opening the dialogue is
often just as important as the substance of that dialogue. Achieving
a mutually satisfactory resolution of every issue discussed herein
will probably never be possible, but the mere act of trying may be a
rewarding experience for all judges.
254. See id.
255. Although Sitting Bull was not a jurist in the English common law sense,
he was a leader of his people who was often called upon to quell disputes among
his band. See ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE LANCE AND THE SHIELD: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
SrrrING BULL 76-89 (1993).
256. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 1 (1995).
[Vol. 24
58
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss2/2
